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ABSTRACT 
 
This dissertation mainly focuses on agricultural policies, water pollution and 
human health. Chapter.2 examines the causal impact of agricultural water pollution on 
individual health outcomes. The findings suggest that agricultural water pollution 
worsens health outcomes and these adverse health effects appear to be largely due to 
contaminated drinking water. Chapter.3 explores both of the intended wealth effect and 
unintended pollution effect on human health caused by China’s agricultural support 
polices. I find that although the income effect dominates on reducing the overall sickness, 
the pollution effect is more substantial on the diarrhea incidence and adult BMI. Income 
affects slightly higher than pollution on adults' overall health, while pollution has higher 
impacts on children's overall health. Chapter.4 builds a dynamic optimization model 
internalizing the health cost of agricultural water pollution. My simulation results suggest 
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that policymakers should manage fertilizer application rates based on the initial nitrate 
concentration levels.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction  
Agriculture, beginning more than 10,000 years ago, plays an important role in the 
human history and is the foundation of modern civilization. Although industrialization 
and urbanization attenuate the impact of agriculture to the economy, the technological 
progress also brings rapid development in agricultural sector in the 20th century: chemical 
fertilizers provide necessary nutrients to crops pesticides control the risks of crop 
diseases, agricultural machines reduce the massive human labor needed for farming. 
While all these technological advancements improve the crop productivity and produce 
more food supply to human beings, they also bring damage to the environment including 
water, air and soil. Among them, water pollution from agriculture is most severe and has 
direct impact to human health (Thayalakumaran etal.,2008; Infascelli et al. 2009; Savci 
2012). 
Compared to the large-scale industrial agriculture in developed countries, most 
developing countries still use traditional household farming mode because of the limited 
farming land with relative huge farming population and cheap labor. The diseconomies of 
scale in agricultural sector cause the production cost to be higher and agricultural 
productivity to be lower than developed countries. Thus, maintaining food security is still 
one of the primary policy goals in developing countries. With 20% of world’s population 
while only 10% of world’s arable land, China’s food insecurity issue has a long history. 
In addition to the continuing erosion of arable land and rural population due to the 
massive economy growth in the urban area, the income inequality between rural and 
urban area is also enlarging which makes agricultural activities less attractive to rural 
residents and further impede the rural development. To maintain the food security as well 
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as to develop rural economy, Chinese government set the agricultural development as its 
primary policy goals in the 21st century starting with a series of agricultural tax abolition 
and agricultural support policies. These policies, on one hand, intended to increase rural 
resident’s enthusiasm for farming and improve the agricultural production. On the other 
hand, it also intended to boost rural economy, reduce the income gap between rural and 
urban area, and improve the rural households’ living standards. On the surface, the 
policies’ intended goals seemed to be reached as both the agricultural production and 
income has been improved (Gale, 2013; Wang and Shen, 2014). However, the 
externalities caused by these policies is not clear and it is necessary to evaluate the 
economic efficiency of these policies by further exploring those unintended external 
impacts. For example, for the view of economics, subsidizing the usage of fertilizers and 
pesticides not only cause more deadweight loss to the economy, but also distort the 
farmer’s behaviors by overusing them to pursue higher net revenue. From the view of 
environmental economist, the excessive usage of fertilizers and pesticides lead to higher 
environmental damage which is a negative externality brought by these polices. 
Agricultural pollution has been overlooked in the history compared to the 
industrial pollution, not only because non-point pollution is harder to be monitored and 
controlled, but also because it has some conflicts with government’s food security goal. 
Recently, governments and the public start to be aware of the severe issues of agricultural 
pollution when the industrial wastes have been well regulated and more negative health 
impact of nutrient and other agricultural pollutants have been found. In fact, in some 
countries, water pollutants from agriculture has exceeded those from industry. For 
example, in China, 67% of phosphorus and 57% of nitrogen pollution in water coming 
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from agriculture (Chen et al., 2017a). Most of these agricultural pollutants are in fact 
from the chemical fertilizers and pesticides that Chinese government encouraged farmers 
to use to increase the crop yields.  
Even with the realization of the harmful agricultural pollution, it is painful to 
remove the pollutants as the pollutants are widely distributed, and some even 
accumulated in the deep groundwater. Nitrate, one of the nutrient pollutants, accumulated 
in the groundwater for more than 50 years, is known to be costly to remove. Because of 
the special features of agricultural pollution, it is wise and economic efficient for 
governments and the public to start preventing these pollutions before it getting worse. 
Previous studies have connected different water pollutants with different negative 
health outcomes, such as diarrhea, cancer, and birth defects. However, the research on the 
combination of agriculture, water pollution and human health are rare in developing 
country context. Some studies only focused on the overall water pollution part 
(Ebenstein, 2012), while some utilized the usage of agricultural inputs as a proxy for 
agricultural pollution (Lai, 2017). My Chapter 2 provides a unique view to look at the 
impact of a composite of different water pollutants associated with the increasing 
agricultural activities and usage of fertilizers and pesticides on individual health in a 
developing country. To obtain exogenous variation in agricultural water pollution, we use 
a quasi-experimental design and exploit a series of agricultural support policies enacted 
in China. We further employ a difference-in-difference-in-differences (DDD) framework 
to examine the differential effect of agricultural water pollution on households with and 
without access to treated water. We find that the agricultural water pollution worsens 
health outcomes through increased incidence of sickness and diarrhea and lower body 
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mass index (BMI) and height-for-age z-score. We further find these adverse health 
impacts appear to be primarily due to contaminated drinking water more than reduced 
food safety. Finally, our study indicates exposure to agricultural water pollution in utero 
and during early childhood results in lower height-for-age z-score.  
Although we found negative pollution effect from agriculture in Chapter 2, it is 
unfair to ignore the facts that these agricultural support polices improve the farming 
household's income and living standards. This intended income improvement might also 
to invest more on the health, such as nutrient intakes, taking health supplements, and 
having preventive health services, which can have positive health effects as well. 
Therefore, to explore the effectiveness of such agricultural support policies, it's necessary 
to understand the magnitudes of both effects. Chapter 3 disentangles the pollution effect 
and income effect of agricultural support policies on human health based on a theoretical 
model of small farming household's profit maximization. I then employ a quasi-
experimental design to explore both impacts on individual- and household- level health 
using longitudinal household data. Furthermore, I use the predicted health index from 
factor and principal component analysis which captures unobserved health conditions to 
replace the observed health indicators as a robustness check. I find that although the 
income effect dominates on reducing the sickness, the pollution effect is more substantial 
on the diarrhea incidence and adult BMI. Income affects slightly higher than pollution on 
adults' overall health, while pollution has higher impacts on children's overall health.  
Given the negative health impacts caused by agriculture, policymakers should 
take these into account the potential environmental cost when making agricultural 
policies. Nitrate pollution, for example, is very costly to remove afterwards, one of the 
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optimal ways to avoid high nitrate contamination in groundwater is to control fertilizer 
application rate during the crop production process. My Chapter 4 tries to find the 
optimal fertilizer application rate in agriculture by incorporating the health cost of nitrate 
pollution in groundwater. Chapter 4 examines the optimal fertilizer application rate in 
agriculture over time by incorporating the health cost from nitrate pollution in 
groundwater. Dynamic optimal control is used to establish the model and simulation is 
conducted in three scenarios of different initial levels of nitrate concentration in 
groundwater. The results indicate that optimal fertilizer application rates are increasing 
over time for all three cases, with the lowest initial fertilizer application rate and highest 
increasing speed in the case of highest nitrate concentration level. In addition, the nitrate 
concentration level is decreasing over time for cases of moderate or high initial nitrate 
concentration level, but increasing at a small rate for the cases of low initial nitrate 
concentration level. In the sensitivity analyses, I find the nitrate decay rate, population, 
and incidence rate all affect the optimal fertilizer application paths, while only decay rate 
actually affects the nitrate concentration levels.  
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Chapter 2: Agricultural Subsidies and Contaminated Spillovers: The Health Effects 
of Agricultural Water Pollution in China  
2.1 Introduction 
Water pollution from agriculture presents one of the most severe environmental 
hazards in China with 67% of phosphorus and 57% of nitrogen pollution in water coming 
from agriculture (Chen et al., 2017a). Yet with almost 20% of the world's population but 
only 10% of the world's arable land, in addition to urbanization continuing to erode its 
rural population, the Chinese government has addressed the country's food needs via 
policies that encourage the use of chemical fertilizers and pesticides in order to increase 
crop productivity. However, these policies come at a real cost to the environment and 
potentially human health as well.  Currently, agricultural pollution exceeds industrial and 
is the country's largest source of water pollution. Fertilizer overuse and poor livestock 
waste management cause nitrate contamination and pesticides that leave toxic residues in 
water, which can subsequently harm human health (Thayalakumaran et al., 2008; 
Infascelli et al., 2009; Savci, 2012). Consequently, evidence demonstrates that rural areas 
in China face greater health risks. These risks appear to be especially salient for children 
(Chen et al., 2016; Su et al., 2013).  
A challenge to estimating the health effects of agricultural water pollution is that 
there are likely systematic differences between agricultural and non-agricultural areas 
outside of water pollution levels that also affect health. Moreover, it can be difficult to 
capture variation in water pollution specifically due to agricultural activities. 
Consequently, much of the current evidence on the health impact of water pollution does 
not address causality nor does it specifically examine the impact of water pollution due to 
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agricultural activities (Ebenstein, 2012; He and Perloff, 2016). Moreover, most current 
evidence on the relationship between water quality and health uses water access or water 
source as a proxy for exposure to water pollution but lacks actual water quality 
measurements (Mangyo, 2008; Zhang, 2012; Zhang and Xu, 2016). Lai (2017) improves 
on this evidence by giving a somewhat more refined measure of agricultural water 
pollution exposure by interacting household water source with province-level pesticide 
intensity. However, pesticide intensity does not capture the pollution caused by fertilizer 
application and animal waste. Furthermore, Lai (2017) focuses on the use of surface 
water for drinking as a proxy for pollution exposure. However, this may miss a 
significant portion of water pollution as 90% of China's shallow groundwater is also 
polluted (Zhang et al., 2015). Consequently, treated water access is a more appropriate 
control group to examine the impact of unsafe drinking water.  
In this article, we explore the causal impact of agricultural water pollution on 
individual health by merging administrative data on observed county-level water 
pollution with a large longitudinal sample of Chinese households from the China Health 
and Nutrition Survey (CHNS). The CHNS covers 12 provinces for 9 waves during the 
years 1989-2011. Specifically, we look at the effect of agricultural water pollution on 
morbidity, diarrhea incidence, body mass index, and height-for-age z-score. We are also 
the first that we are aware of to explore the effect of in utero and infant exposure to 
agricultural water pollution on child health.  
Our article contributes to this literature in three key ways. First, we provide a 
plausibly causal estimate of the health effect of water pollution due to agricultural 
activities. Second, we use observed data on water pollution and quality, rather than 
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proxying for water quality with water source or agricultural input use. Finally, we 
examine the different channels through which the relationship between agricultural water 
pollution and health operates.  
To obtain exogenous variation in agricultural water pollution, we use a quasi-
experimental design and exploit a series of agricultural support policies enacted in China 
during the years 2004-2006.1 These policies were nationwide and exogenous and led to 
dramatic increases in grain and livestock production (Wang and Shen, 2014; Lai, 2017; 
Gale, 2013). Our empirical approach identifies the effects of water pollution due to 
changes in agricultural activities as a result of these policies. This identification strategy 
relies on the assumption that pollution from other sources were not similarly affected 
during the policy period. We know of no other policies enacted in China during this time 
that would similarly affect water pollution from non-agricultural sources. Additionally, 
trends in health and water quality are improving throughout our study period, suggesting 
that the water degradation we identify off in the post-policy period is unlikely to be due 
economic activities outside of agriculture. In fact, our identification in this paper comes 
from a change in the composition of pollutants due to changes in agricultural activities 
rather than changes in levels overall water quality. Nonetheless, this violation is 
impossible to rule out, and we address this possibility through falsification tests and 
providing graphical evidence on trends in individual pollutants (i.e., one primarily 
associated with industrial pollution and on primarily associated with agricultural 
pollution). These checks can be found in the Results section.  
																																								 																				
1 Lai (2017) similarly used these policies to obtain exogenous variation in province level-pesticide use. 
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Finally, we examine the potential mechanisms through which agricultural water 
pollution affects human health. Individuals can be exposed to agricultural pollution 
through contaminated drinking water as well as through reduced food safety by using 
polluted water in the food production and processing. Households with access to water 
treated at a water treatment plant would have substantially less exposure to contaminated 
drinking water than those without that access. We therefore examine the differential 
impact of county-level agricultural water pollution on households with and without 
access to treated water to parse out the extent that contaminated drinking water drives the 
effects on human health.  
We find that agricultural water pollution worsens health outcomes through 
increased incidence of sickness and diarrhea and reduced body mass index and height-
for-age z-scores. Our results also indicate that in utero and infant exposure to agricultural 
water pollution can substantially reduce child-height-for-age z-scores. Finally, the 
adverse health effects of agricultural water pollution appear to be almost entirely driven 
by exposure to contaminated drinking water. 
2.2 Agricultural Pollution and Health in China 
China has undergone rapid agricultural development to meet its food needs 
resulting in high demand for agricultural inputs and a correspondingly high 
environmental cost. The economic cost of environmental damage from agriculture is 7-
10% of total agricultural GDP (Norse and Ju, 2015). The three primary areas of 
environmental damage from agriculture are water pollution, soil pollution, and 
greenhouse gas emissions (Chen et al., 2017b). Among them, water pollution is the most 
severe and has direct negative health impacts.  
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Water pollutants from agriculture come from chemical fertilizers, pesticides, and 
livestock waste. Fertilizers added to soil increase essential nutrients for plant growth. 
However, these nutrients include nitrates and phosphates which can flood surface water 
and groundwater causing nutrient pollution. Moreover, the overuse of fertilizers can 
decrease soil fertility and reduce future plant yields. China uses nearly 550 kg of 
chemical fertilizers per hectare of land on average, which is much more than the average 
100 kg used in the rest of the world. The excessive fertilizer use in China is mainly 
caused by input subsidies, low inputs prices, small-scale farming, risk-averse farms, and 
structural changes in farm labor (Smith and Siciliano, 2015). Furthermore, the growing 
number of concentrated animal feeding operations (CAFOs) substantially adds to nutrient 
pollution levels due to livestock waste (Norse and Ju, 2015).  Nutrient pollution from 
phosphorus and nitrogen are a major source of water pollution that affects not only 
surface water quality through eutrophication, but also groundwater quality and soil 
acidification (Smith and Siciliano, 2015).   
In addition to fertilizers, a substantial amount of agricultural water pollutions 
results from pesticide use. Pesticides are toxic substances used to kill weeds and insects 
that threaten high plant yields. However, pesticides contain toxic components and are not 
well-regulated in China. Consequently, excessive pesticide residues can be left on the 
agricultural products and cause considerable food safety concerns in China. These toxins 
can stay in the soil and continue to pollute crops as well as flow into the water systems to 
contaminate drinking water. 
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2.2.1 Health Impact Channels of Agricultural Pollution 
Agricultural water pollution affects human health through two channels: 
contaminated drinking water and food safety issues. Approximately, 300 million rural 
residents in China lack access to safe drinking water (Smith and Siciliano, 2015). 
Drinking water pollutants include bacteria from unsanitary conditions and animal waste, 
nutrient pollution from nitrogen and phosphorus accumulation, and toxins and heavy 
metals from pesticides and wastewater discharge. Food safety issues occur when 
chemical residues left on food exceeds the safety standard as a result of polluted water 
and excessive pesticide application during the production or processing stage.  
Bacteria in drinking water is the leading cause of waterborne diseases such as 
diarrhea and Hepatitis A (Lam et al., 2013). However, this health risk can be easily 
avoided by boiling water, a practice which has been widely adopted in China. 
Nutrient pollution associated with algal blooms and nitrate contamination poses 
multiple hazards to human health, including cancer and blue baby syndrome 
(Thayalakumaran et al., 2008; Infascelli et al., 2009; Savci, 2012). Chen et al. (2016) find 
children tend to face more significant health risks from this kind of pollution than adults. 
Nutrient pollution accumulates in the groundwater and is more severe in rural areas with 
agricultural production (Su et al., 2013). Unlike bacterial pollution, nutrient pollution, 
especially nitrate, is very hard to remove from drinking water and is not reduced through 
boiling water.  
Pesticides can also accumulate in the water system and damage ecosystems 
through soil microorganisms and harmful insect species (van der Werf, 1996). Toxic 
pesticides left in drinking water and on food pose a health risk for both adults and 
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children (Gilden et al., 2010; Weiss et al., 2004). Lu et al. (2010) conclude that the 
frequent consumption of food with pesticide residue can cause developmental and 
neurological defects in young children. Lai (2017) also finds evidence that pesticides 
adversely impact health of the elderly. Since pesticides can affect health through drinking 
water and food, it is necessary to consider both channels when examining the relationship 
between agricultural water pollution and health. 
2.2.2 China's Agricultural Support Policies 
Quasi-experimental design, such as an event study, is a common way to control 
for the unobserved confounders and explore causal relationships (e.g., Lai (2017)). 
Agricultural support policies in China are utilized in this study to examine the causal 
impact of water pollution from agricultural activities on health outcomes. Between 2004 
and 2006, China implemented a series of agricultural support policies including 
abolishing agricultural taxes and providing agricultural subsidies.  
China has a long history of implementing agricultural taxes, dating back 2600 
years. In the last century, the agricultural tax was one of the most important fiscal income 
sources for the Chinese government. In 1949, the agricultural tax accounted for 40% of 
government revenue. However, this share decreased to 2.6% by 2002 after the rapid 
economic growth following China's Economic Reform in 1978 (Wang and Shen, 2014). 
As the importance of agricultural tax revenue declined, income inequality between rural 
and urban households substantially increased. Consequently, during the mid-2000s, the 
Chinese government began to implement policies designed to improve agricultural 
productivity and income in rural areas such as abolishing the agricultural tax and 
providing agricultural input subsidies.   
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Agricultural taxes and related fees are significant in China. The largest of these is 
a proportional tax on perennial production called the agricultural tax. Perennial 
production is different from actual production in that it estimated based on land acreage 
and average historical production accounting for soil quality, crop types, regional climate, 
and landscapes. Perennial production per acre for a household, once determined, stays 
constant each year for an extended period no matter what the actual yields and profits are 
in a given year. The most recent taxable perennial production was calculated as the 
average production of the five years before 1999. Therefore, this agricultural tax 
effectively operates as a fixed land tax. Other taxes on agriculture include taxes on 
special products that were taxed based on sales income and the agricultural surtax that 
was taxed based on the agricultural tax. In addition to taxes related to agricultural 
activities, fees like the township and township education fees also added to the financial 
burden of rural households. Unlike urban households, rural households are not tax 
exempt. Although the income of 90% of rural households falls below the tax exemption 
line, they still have to pay taxes, making the agricultural tax system regressive.   
Between 2000 and 2003, the Chinese government began experimenting with 
agricultural tax reform. It first eliminated all taxes and fees except the primary 
agricultural tax. Then in 2005, the government started to abolish the agricultural tax as 
well.  By the beginning of 2006, all agricultural taxes were abolished in China (Gale, 
2013). These tax abolition policies made almost no difference to those who live in coastal 
provinces as the taxes were relatively low compared to their annual income. However, to 
farmers who live in poor areas, these tax policies made significant improvements to their 
lives.  
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Additionally, during the period 2004-2006, the Chinese government implemented 
a series of agricultural support policies including direct payment to grain producers, rice 
and wheat price supports, and subsidies for agricultural inputs such as chemical fertilizers 
and pesticides. In 2007, subsidies were also provided for pork production. These policies 
resulted in substantial increases in grain production and the use of chemical fertilizers 
and pesticides (Gale, 2013). Figure 2.1 plots rice and livestock production during the 
survey period. We clearly see a sharp increase in production during the 2004-2006 period 
and after.  
These policies were largely effective in promoting the Chinese government’s 
objective of improving rural well-being. The post policy period experienced 
improvements in multiple measures of well-being including rural health and income. 
However,  the post-2006 period also saw increased water pollution from agricultural 
activities which may mitigate some of the positive effects resulting from these policies. In 
this article, we use longitudinal water quality and household data and exploit these 
changes in agricultural policies from 2004 to 2006 to obtain exogenous variation in water 
pollution due to agricultural activities in a quasi-experimental framework.   
2.3 Data 
To explore the relationship between agricultural water pollution and health, we 
exploit unique longitudinal household data and merge it with two sources of longitudinal 
data on water quality. We are thus able to connect variation in observed levels of 
agricultural water pollution to individual-level health outcomes. This allows us to 
improve upon previous research which proxies for water pollution exposure with water 
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source type (Mangyo, 2008; Zhang, 2012; Zhang and Xu, 2016) or with the interaction of 
water source type and regional-level pesticide use Lai (2017). 
2.3.1 China Health and Nutrition Survey (CHNS) 
Our household data come from the China Health and Nutrition Survey (CHNS). 
The CHNS is a rich longitudinal data set that follows approximately 4,400 households 
with around 19,000 individuals over nine survey waves in the years 1989, 1993, 1997, 
2000, 2004, 2006, 2009, and 20112. The surveys cover both rural and urban areas in nine 
Chinese provinces from 1989 to 2009 with three additional provinces included in the 
2011 wave. Our primary water quality data began in 2004. Therefore, we focus on CHNS 
data collected in the 2004, 2006, 2009 and 2011 survey waves.   
We only include the 8 provinces highlighted in Figure 2.4. We exclude the 3 
newly added provinces in the 2011 survey in order to exploit the panel. We also exclude 
Guizhou province because there are no water quality monitoring sites there during the 
study period. The 8 provinces in our study are located in the Northeast, East, Middle and 
Southwest parts of China. These provinces are representative of China and are diverse in 
terms of geographic location, economic development, population, urban to rural ratio, 
agricultural intensity, and water availability.  
The CHNS collects extensive information at the individual- and household-level, 
particularly with regards to health and nutrition. In every survey round, information on 
morbidity and anthropometric measurements were collected for all sample individuals 
making these data uniquely suited towards examining health in China. The specific health 
																																								 																				
2 The number of observed households and individuals vary across survey waves as the project also follows 
households formed out of sample households. 
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measures we examine are whether or not the respondent reported being sick or having 
diarrhea in the last four weeks, adult body mass index (BMI), child BMI-for-age z-scores 
(BMIZ), and child height-for-age z-scores (HAZ).  
Table 2.1 reports the descriptive statistics from our study sample across age 
groups. 19% of individuals in our sample reported being sick in the last 4 weeks, while 
only 2% of them had diarrhea during that time. Individuals aged 55 years and above 
report higher rates of sickness and diarrhea than other age groups while children younger 
than 18 years have the lowest sickness and diarrhea rate. Children and elderly are usually 
considered to be more vulnerable with respect to their health. The low sickness rate 
among children may indicate the high value placed on children in China due to its one-
child policy, evidenced by the fact that children received the highest rate of preventive 
health care use among all age groups reported in table 2.1. 
There is a large sample of households engaged in agriculture in our data. 
Approximately 20% own at least one agricultural machine and 30% raise livestock. 
While 78% have tap water, only 55.4% of our sample have access to treated water. 
Health outcomes by survey wave are summarized in table 2.2. Sickness and diarrhea 
incidence is much higher in the post-2000 waves than in the 2000 wave, but both 
measures fluctuate across waves. The anthropometric measurements BMI, BMI z-scores 
and height-for-age z-scores exhibit an increasing trend over time, indicating that, on 
average, health is increasing over the sample period.  
2.3.2 Water Quality Data 
Our water quality data come from two sources. The primary data we use in our 
main analysis is measured from water monitoring sites throughout the country by China's 
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Ministry of Environmental Protection. Figure 2.4 illustrates the geographic distribution of 
these sites.  At each of these sites, water pollutants were recorded weekly including 
surface water levels of chemical oxygen demand (COD), dissolved oxygen (DO), and 
ammonia nitrogen (NH3-N). These measurements were then used to generate a water 
quality grade index ranging from 1 to 6. This index increases with pollution level, thus a 
higher grade represents lower water quality. An index higher than 3 means the water 
cannot be used for drinking. From this point forward, we will refer to the water quality 
index as the water pollution index for clarity.  
At the county level, we calculate the annual mean value of the water pollution 
index. We then assign each county in the sample provinces the annual mean water 
pollution index measured at the monitoring sites nearest to the county centroid. These 
measures were then linked with the CHNS data at the county-level. County is a level 3 
administrative division in China, which is smaller than province and prefecture. Figure 
2.4 overlays our sample county polygons in our study provinces with water monitoring 
sites. While it would be ideal to connect each county with its nearest upstream water 
monitoring site, our data do not allow this due to privacy restrictions. However, most of 
our sample counties are small and therefore the nearest monitoring site is likely a 
reasonable proxy for average water pollution exposure in the county. 
In addition to the water quality data, we also recorded the province-level 
drinkable water percentage as reported in each province's water resource bulletin. This 
measure is the percent of the total river length in each province that meets the drinking 
water standard based on the water quality data collected by the Water Resource Bureau.3 
																																								 																				
3 Water is safe to drink if the water pollution index is 3 and lower. 
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We use this measure to check the robustness of our findings to an alternative measure of 
water quality.  
Table 2.2 also reports the mean and standard deviation of our water quality 
measures in the sample provinces. Figure 2.2 similarly plots the water pollution index 
(Panel a) and drinkable water percentage (Panel b) over the survey period.  The left plots 
of Panels a and b show water quality over time, while the right plots illustrate the same 
measures but de-trended by year. During the survey period, particularly since 2000/2004, 
average water quality appears to be improving over time. The water pollution index 
exhibits a decreasing trend over time. Drinkable water percentage fluctuates a bit more 
but is overall improving, especially after 2006. Nonetheless, the average water pollution 
index hovers around 3 for the duration of the sample period indicating that much of the 
water in our sample area is unsafe to drink. Moreover, when looking at the de-trended 
plots on the right-hand-side of Figure 2.2, we clearly see reductions in water quality 
during the period 2003/2004 to 2006, when the agricultural policies were being 
implemented. In particular, the water pollution index peaks in 2006 when the input 
subsidies were introduced.   
2.4 Empirical Model 
2.4.1 Health Impact from Agricultural Water Pollution 
We are interested in the causal effect of agricultural water pollution on health. 
However, this presents a couple of empirical challenges. First, water pollution caused by 
agriculture cannot be observed directly as the monitors also capture water degradation 
from other sources, such as industrial pollution and residential discharge. Second, 
changes in agricultural activities may also systematically vary with other determinants of 
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health such as income, food prices, and disease environment (related to temperature and 
precipitation). Employing a quasi-experimental design with individual fixed effects, we 
use changes in water quality that result from the full implementation of the agricultural 
support policies in 2006. These policies were nationwide, exogenous and targeted 
agricultural activities. Therefore, we assume that changes in water quality observed 
around 2006 and after can be associated with exogenous changes in agricultural 
activities. This assumption, of course, would be violated if other policies and/or 
conditions in China simultaneously caused increased water pollution from non-
agricultural sources. While we cannot test for this directly, we address this concern in the 
Results section. We thus use the year 2006 (when the input subsidies were implemented 
and agricultural taxes were fully abolished) in a quasi-experimental, event study approach 
as follows: 
 
𝐻𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑡ℎ'( = 𝛽+, + 𝛽,,𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡2006'(×𝑊𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑟'( + 𝛽77𝑊𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑟'(+ 𝛽8,𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡2006'( + 𝛽9,𝑋'( + 𝜆( + 𝜇' + 𝜀'( (1) 
Equation (1) models the health outcome of individual i at survey wave t. The health 
outcomes we examine, HealthEF, include: a dummy variable indicating whether the 
individual was sick in the last 4 weeks, had diarrhea in the last 4 weeks,  adult BMI (for 
individuals aged 18 and above), child BMI-for-age  z-score (for individuals aged below 
18), and child height-for-age z-score (for individuals aged below 18).  County-level water 
pollution exposure for individual i at survey wave t is captured by WaterEF. We use the 
annual average water pollution index, calculated as the mean value at the nearest 
monitoring site to individual i at year t, to measure water quality - the higher the value 
the worse the water quality. As an alternative measure, we also use drinkable water 
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percentage, measured as the percent of the surface water that is drinkable in province p at 
year t as a proxy for water quality - the higher the value the better the water quality. 
However, this latter measure is less preferable as it is only available at the province level, 
which will miss local spatial variation. XEF includes household and individual controls, 
such as log household income, individual daily calorie intake, unhealthy diet (=1 if diet is 
not healthy4 ), whether the individual uses preventive health care, household sanitation 
conditions, age, gender, and ethnic group (=1 if belong to ethnic minorities). λF is a vector 
of year fixed effects and µE	is a vector of individual fixed effects. 
Equation (1) allows us to compare the different impact of water quality on health 
before and after the agricultural subsidy policy starting from 2006. The differential 
impact may be due to changes in the composition of pollutants caused by changes in 
agricultural activities rather than changes in the level of water pollution as a whole. 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡2006'( is a policy indicator that equal to 1 if the survey was conducted after 2006, 
thus 𝛽8, captures the average health difference in the sample in the post- versus pre-policy 
period. 𝛽,, from Equation (1) captures the average difference in the effect of water 
pollution on health in the post-policy period. Since we account for trends in health and 
pollution by controlling for year fixed effects, we interpret the differential variation in 
water pollution in the post-period as primarily coming from agriculture, and thus interpret 𝛽,, as the the effect of agricultural water pollution on health. 
We also examine the effect of agricultural water pollution due to these policies on 
early childhood health proxied by child HAZ and BMIZ for children aged 6 years old and 
																																								 																				
4 According to the US recommendations on dietary reference intake for total energy (Institute of Medicine, 
2005), we define unhealthy diet as having at least one of three macronutrients out of the US dietary 
reference intake range. 
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under. Early childhood is marked by rapid physical growth. Therefore, health inputs 
(such as pollution) often have a larger effect on child growth during this childhood period 
than in others. Consequently, we surmised that there might be a difference in the HAZ of 
children who spent their early childhood before and after the policy. We replace the 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡2006'( with 𝐵𝑜𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟2006'( which equal to 1 if the child 𝑖 was born after 2006. 
The model is specified as: 
 
𝐻𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑡ℎ'( = 𝛽+7 + 𝛽,7𝐵𝑜𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟2006'(×𝑊𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑟'( + 𝛽77𝑊𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑟'(+ 𝛽87𝐵𝑜𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟2006'( + 𝛽97𝑋'( + 𝜆( + 𝜇' + 𝜀'( (2) 
In Equation (2), we use community instead of individual fixed effects as each individual 
were only observed once at this age range.  
By interacting with water quality with the 2006 agricultural supporting policies, 
this quasi-experimental framework teases out the pollution effect due to agricultural 
activities from the non-water-pollution effects of these activities (e.g., changes in 
agricultural income). However, the mechanisms through which water pollution adversely 
affects human health not only include drinking polluted water, but also intaking 
agricultural products that are produced or processed using polluted water. 𝛽,, in Equation 
1 and 𝛽,7 in Equation (2) capture the total effect of both mechanisms. In the following 
section, we attempt to disentangle these two effects.  
2.4.2 Health Effects through Contaminated Drinking Water 
Residents who drink untreated contaminated water experience greater drinking 
water exposure to polluted water than those who have access to treated water. Other 
factors relating to food safety and agricultural air pollution are also associated with 
agricultural pollution and can have a negative impact on health (Lai, 2017). These 
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sources should similarly affect individuals with or without access to treated drinking 
water. Therefore, to disentangle these two channels, we allow for heterogeneity in the 
water pollution effect modeled in Equations (1) and (2) across individuals with and 
without access to treated water. We include a triple interaction between water treatment 
status, water quality, and the post-2006 indicator as follows: 
 
𝐻𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑡ℎ'( = 𝛽+8 + 𝛽,8𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡2006'(×𝑊𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑟'(×	𝑈𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑤𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑟'(+ 𝛽78𝑊𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑟'(×	𝑈𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑤𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑟'(+ 𝛽88𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡2006'(×𝑈𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑤𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑟'(+ 𝛽98𝑊𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑟'(×	𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡2006'(+ 𝛽U9𝑈𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑤𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑟'( + 𝛽V8𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡2006'(+ 𝛽W8𝑊𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑟'( + 𝛽X8𝑋'( + 𝜆( + 𝜇' + 𝜀'( 
(3) 
𝑈𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑤𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑟'( equals 1 if the household individual 𝑖 lives in at year 𝑡 does not have 
access to water treated at water plants. While access to treated versus untreated water is 
endogenous to health outcomes, we are not specifically interested in the health effects of 
access to treated water. Rather, we are interested in the heterogeneous effects of 
agricultural water pollution across these two groups in order to disentangle the health 
impacts of water pollution due to contaminated drinking water from that of other factors 
such as food safety (Lai, 2017; Kellogg and Wolff, 2008).  
As in Equation (2), we also replace the 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡2006'( in Equation (3) with  𝐵𝑜𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟2006'( to examine the difference in the effect of water pollution on the 
treated and untreated water groups for children born before and after the policy in 
Equation (4).  
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𝐻𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑡ℎ'( = 𝛽+9+ 𝛽,9𝑊𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑟'(×	𝑈𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑤𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑟'(×	𝐵𝑜𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟2006'(+ 𝛽79𝑊𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑟'(×	𝑈𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑤𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑟'(+ 𝛽89𝑈𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑤𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑟'(×	𝐵𝑜𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟2006'(+ 𝛽99𝑊𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑟'(×		𝐵𝑜𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟2006'(+ 𝛽U9𝑈𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑤𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑟'( + 𝛽V9	𝐵𝑜𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟2006'(+ 𝛽W9𝑊𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑟'(	+	𝛽X9𝑋'( + 𝜆( + 𝜇' + 𝜀'( 
(4) 
𝛽,8 in Equation (3) and 𝛽,9 in Equation (4) estimates the difference in the effect of post-
2006 water pollution on individuals with untreated water and thus at higher risk of 
contaminated drinking water. Therefore, these coefficient should reflect the additional 
effect of agricultural pollution in drinking water, while 𝛽98 and 𝛽99 in Equations (3) and 
(4), respectively, should capture the effect of agricultural water pollution through non-
drinking water channels.  
2.5 Results 
Interpreting 𝛽,, as the effect of agricultural water pollution would be invalid if 
other policies and/or conditions in China simultaneously caused increased water pollution 
from non-agricultural sources. While we cannot test for this circumstance directly, we 
feel safe in assuming the marginal increases in post-2006 water pollution is due to 
agricultural activities for three reasons. First, to our knowledge, China enacted no other 
policies that would similarly increase water pollution from non-agricultural sources at the 
same time as these policies. Second, as seen in Figure 2.2, general water quality has been 
steadily improving in China over time, including during the time of these agricultural 
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policies. So, the water degradation we identify off of post-2006 is counter to these trends 
and is unlikely to be due to non-agricultural economic activities. However, to further 
dispel this concern, we conduct a placebo test by replicating all of our results below with 
a falsely imputed policy year of 2000 (well before the agricultural support policies were 
implemented). Unfortunately, we cannot use the water pollution index for this test, as this 
measure is not available in 2000 (the first pre-2004 CHNS survey wave available). We, 
therefore, can only use province-level drinkable water percentage as the water quality 
measure. These results are reported in appendix Table A.9 and Table A.10. Overall, we 
do not find significant effects around the placebo policy year. Only one estimated placebo 
effect, using the triple interaction model in Equation (3) (Table A.10), is statistically 
significant but has the opposite sign of what we would expect. This, therefore, may due to 
spurious correlation. 
Finally, Figure 2.3 plots average levels of the individual pollutants, NH3-N and 
COD, over time measured in our data. While each of these pollutants can come from 
industrial, agricultural, or residential sources, NH3-N is primarily sourced from 
agricultural activities and COD is primarily sourced from industrial activities. For 
example, Zuo et al. (2013) found that industrial pollution contributed to 44% of COD in 
the Yangtze River in China while agricultural sources only contributed to 16%. On the 
other hand, agricultural sources contributed to almost 60% of NH3-N pollution in the 
river while industrial pollution only contributed 5%. In Figure 2.3, we clearly see NH3-N 
uptick after 2006, while COD steadily declines over the entire sample period. We, 
therefore, feel that the negative health effects of water pollution we identify are largely 
due to agricultural activities. 
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2.5.1  Health Effects of Agricultural Water Pollution 
Table 2.3 reports the estimates from Equation (1) on the effect of water quality on 
a variety of health outcomes. Columns (1) -(2) of Table 2.3 report the effect of 
agricultural water pollution on the incidence of sickness and diarrhea in people of all ages 
in our sample. Column (3) of Table 2.3 reports the estimated effect on BMI for adults 
(aged 18 and older).  Columns (4) -(5) of Table 2.3 focus on children and report the 
estimated effects on BMI-for-age z-score and height-for-age z-score for children under 
the age of 18 in our sample. Although not reported in Table 2.3, all estimates include all 
controls and individual and year fixed effects. The individual fixed effects control for 
time-invariant characteristics that are correlated with water quality and health, such as 
genetic diseases, birth defects, individual behaviors, and household environment as well 
as other pollution sources, sanitation conditions, and health infrastructure.   
The coefficient on the variable 	𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡2006'(, 𝛽8,, captures the conditional, de-
trended average difference in health before and after 2006. The coefficient on the water 
pollution index alone, 𝛽7,, captures the association between levels of general water 
pollution and health, conditional on control variables and individual and time fixed 
effects. The primary coefficient of interest is that on the interaction between 	𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡2006'( 
and the water pollution index. This is the additional effect of water pollution on health 
outcomes due to pollution changes that occurred after the agricultural support policies 
were implemented. We, therefore, assume these changes are due to exogenous changes in 
agricultural activities and interpret this as the health effect of agricultural water pollution. 
For example, in Column (2), we see that, on average, individuals are healthier over time 
as the post-2006 period is associated with a 7.16% decrease in diarrhea incidence. 
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However, agricultural water pollution resulting from the implementation of the 2004-
2006 agricultural support policies exerts a significant and positive impact on the diarrhea 
incidence, a common waterborne disease.  Specifically, a one-unit increase in the water 
pollution index results in a 0.316% increase in diarrhea incidence.  The average effect of 
agricultural water pollution on other measured health outcomes is not statistically 
significant.  
Instead of examining the average current health effects of changes in water 
pollution due to the agricultural policies, in Table 2.4 we examine the effects of in utero 
and infant exposure to agricultural water pollution resulting from the policies by 
replacing the 2006 policy year indicator with an indicator for whether a child’s birth year 
is after 2006. Children born in 2006 and before were not exposed to the water pollution 
resulting from these policies during the in utero and infant stages while those born after 
2006 were. We never observe the subsample of children born after 2006 when they are 
older than five or six years old. We therefore limit the sample for this analysis to children 
six years old and younger. In this way we are comparing the effects of in utero exposure 
to water pollution for similar age cohorts. In this analysis, we are unable to control for 
individual fixed effects since we only observe each child once during this age range. We 
therefore, control for community fixed effects in addition to year fixed effects in addition 
to our other controls. Interestingly, the effect of agricultural water pollution resulting 
from the policies does not exert a statistically significant effect on either BMI z-score or 
HAZ for these two cohorts. 
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2.5.2 The Contaminated Drinking Water Channel 
The results reported in Table 2.3 and Table 2.4 capture the total effect of 
agricultural water pollution due to both contaminated drinking water as well as other 
channels such as reduced food safety. These results also represent a weighted average of 
the effect on households with access to treated water and those without. The former 
group is much less likely to be exposed to contaminated drinking water than the latter. So 
if water pollution primarily acts through, say, contaminated drinking water, then it is 
possible that individuals in a pollution exposed county but with access to treated water 
may wash out the potential effects on those with greater exposure in their drinking water. 
This may be a reason most of the results reported in Table 2.3 and Table 2.4 are 
statistically insignificant. 
In Table 2.5 and Table 2.6, we estimate Equations (3) and (4), respectively, which 
compare the effect of agricultural water pollution on households with and without access 
to treated water. In this case, our primary coefficient of interest is that on the triple 
interaction of water pollution, an indicator for the post-2006 period, and an indicator for 
whether a household's water is untreated at a water plant. We interpret this estimate as the 
effect of agricultural water pollution through the channel of contaminated drinking water. 
All results are estimated with all controls and individual and year fixed effects.  
According to the results reported in Table 2.5, for those without access to treated 
drinking water, agricultural water pollution significantly increases the likelihood of 
sickness and decreases adult BMI and child HAZ. Increasing agricultural water pollution 
by one unit results in a 1.45% increase in the likelihood of being sick in the last 4 weeks, 
a 0.10 reduction in adult BMI and reduction in child HAZ by 0.10 standard deviations. 
	28	
	
The estimated effects on diarrhea incidence and child BMI z-scores are not statistically 
significant. One explanation for the insignificance of the effect on diarrhea may be that 
households without access to treated water may undertake some avoidance behaviors 
such as boiling drinking water to remove the bacteria, which is a major cause of diarrhea. 
However, while boiling water may protect against diarrhea, it would not remove other 
toxic components such as nitrates and heavy metals that can worsen health in other ways. 
Regardless, it is also worth noting that although it is insignificant, the point estimate on 
the triple interaction for diarrhea reported in Table 2.5 is almost identical to the 
agricultural water pollution effect reported in Table 2.3. Additionally, while we cannot 
interpret these estimates as causal effects, the significant coefficients estimated for 
interaction indicate the drinking water sources cause significant difference in the impact 
of water pollution on health after 2006. 
In Table 2.6, we report estimates from Equation (4) to compare the health impact 
of infant and in utero exposure to agricultural water pollution for children in households 
with and without access to treated drinking water. Like with Equation (2), we do this by 
replacing the indicator for the post-2006 period with one indicating if a child was born 
after 2006 and thus exposed to agricultural water pollution during the in utero/infancy 
period resulting from the policy changes.5  According to Table 2.6, agricultural water 
pollution in drinking water during the uterine and infant periods imposes an adverse 
effect on children's HAZ for our subsample of children 6 years old and younger. For 
																																								 																				
5 Even though the children born after 2006 will have also been exposed to this agricultural water pollution 
throughout their entire first 6 years of life, we do not interpret this effect as the effect of early childhood 
exposure. This is because while some of the children born before 2006 would have never been exposed 
to these policies, some of them would have had some exposure. For example, a child born in 2003 would 
not have been exposed to the full thrust of policies during the uterine/infant period, but she/he would 
have been exposed during ages 3 to 6.  
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children in households with untreated water, increased agricultural pollution in drinking 
water decreases child HAZ by 0.30 standard deviations. We see no significant effect on 
BMIZ, which makes sense given that weight is more sensitive to current exposure while 
HAZ would capture the cumulative effects of past exposure (e.g., during infancy). 
Overall, the results reported in Table 2.5 and Table 2.6 suggest that agricultural water 
pollution adversely affects health, primarily through contaminated drinking water.   
Finally, while we cannot interpret these estimates as causal effects, it is worth 
noting that the significant coefficients on the interaction between 	𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡2006'( 
/	𝐵𝑜𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟2006'( and water pollution reported in Table 2.5 and Table 2.6 (for sickness 
and HAZ, respectively) suggest that increased agricultural pollution outside the drinking 
water channel improves health. While this may seem counter-intuitive, remember that our 
identifying variation on post-2006 water pollution is based on changes in agricultural 
activities. Thus if the adverse effects of water pollution due to these activities are largely 
captured by the drinking water channel in the triple interaction, then this coefficient may 
be capturing the positive health effects of increased agricultural activities in the post-
policy period such as higher farm income.  
2.5.3 Measurement Error 
 We are concerned about potential measurement error in the water quality data 
collected from nearest monitoring sites. Therefore, as a robustness check, we conduct the 
above analysis using water quality averaged at the province level. Specifically, we use 
the province-level water pollution index calculated as the mean value of all the 
monitoring sites in a province in a given year. Results from estimating Equations (1) – (4) 
using province-level water pollution are reported in Tables A.1 - A.4, respectively. While 
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there are some minor differences in magnitudes and significance, these results are largely 
similar to our main results reported in Tables 2.3 - 2.6.  
We also check the robustness of our results to using an alternative source and 
measure of water quality. We conduct the above analysis using province-level percentage 
of drinkable water rather than the water pollution index. To do so, we recorded the 
drinkable water percentage from province annual water resource bulletins. Percentage of 
drinkable water is measured as the percentage of the river length that meets the minimum 
standard for drinking water. A higher percentage of drinkable water reflects better water 
quality at the province level. The results estimating Equations (1) – (4) are reported in 
Tables A.5 - A.8 respectively. Overall these results support the results using the water 
pollution index. However, none of the results reported in Table A.7 are statistically 
significant. 
2.6 Conclusion and Discussion 
Non-point agricultural pollution is hard to monitor and control. Our research aims 
to explore the health impact of agricultural water pollution and the different channels 
through which this influence occurs. Our findings indicate that agricultural water 
pollution increases morbidity (i.e., sickness and diarrhea) and decreases BMI. We also 
find that exposure to agricultural water pollution in utero and in infancy reduces child 
height-for-age z-scores. Our findings suggest that contaminated drinking water appears to 
be the primary channel through which these effects operate.  
Food security and economic development are always a priority in developing 
countries. However, the health cost from environmental damage should not be 
overlooked in the policy design as we seek to improve rural livelihoods. This research 
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will be of interest to policymakers in China concerned with agricultural water pollution. 
Recently, the Chinese government has demonstrated increasing interest in improving the 
health and quality of life of people in rural areas. Rural development policies include 
agricultural taxes abolition to narrow the income inequality, agricultural subsidies to 
support and protect agriculture, rural infrastructure improvement, the introduction of rural 
cooperative medical care system and pension insurance, the expansion of free 
compulsory education. All these policies aimed at improving rural households’ income, 
living standards, health, social security, and education. However, some of these positive 
effects may be mitigated by the policies’ effects on agricultural water pollution. 
Specifically, agricultural water pollution increases even as other sources of water 
pollution are decreasing. Given the negative health impact found in this research and 
other papers, it is important to implement policies that targeting at rural development as 
well as reducing agricultural pollution. In fact, some regional governments have 
implemented programs and regulations targeted at agricultural pollution control by 
subsidizing agricultural inputs based on necessary needs, providing free agricultural 
education and direction for farmers to use agricultural inputs appropriately, and giving 
incentives for green agricultural products. These environmental friendly policies can 
reduce the negative impacts from agriculture without sacrificing the benefits brought by 
the policies, and we suggest them to be expanded on a national scale.  
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Figure 2.1: Livestock and Rice Production in China 
	
Source: Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO): http://www.fao.org/faostat/en/#data 
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Figure 2.2: Water Quality Over Time 
 
(a) Water Pollution Index (Higher Means Worse), Right Panel is De-trended over Time 
 
 
(b) Drinkable Water Percentage, Right Panel is De-trended over Time 
 
 
 
Note: Water quality is affected by multiple factors and is clearly improving over time. 
The de-trended plots allow us to explore the fluctuations of water quality that were 
possibly caused by agricultural policies. The vertical axis in these two graphs is the 
annual average water quality data over the 8 study provinces. 
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Figure 2.3: Average Levels of NH3-N and COD  
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Figure 2.4: Study Provinces and Water Monitoring Sites
 
 
Note: The map shows the locations of the 8 provinces that are included in this study and 
all the monitoring sites with water quality grade data recorded on the Ministry of 
Environmental Protection website during 2004-2011. Although CHNS contains 9 
provinces in the 2004-2009 survey and 12 provinces in the 2011 survey, we exclude 
Guizhou Province because the lack of monitoring sites in that province and the three 
newly added provinces in the 2011 wave for analysis consistency.   
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Table 2.1: Descriptive Statistics 
 	
All Age Age below 18 Age 18 to 55 Age 55 and above
Health Status
Sick in recent 4 weeks 0.190 0.119 0.140 0.322
(0.393) (0.324) (0.347) (0.467)
Have diarrhea in recent 4 weeks 0.0206 0.0159 0.0179 0.0281
(0.142) (0.125) (0.133) (0.165)
Farming Status
Maximum individual farming months in the household 2.318 2.838 2.398 1.876
(3.829) (4.066) (3.840) (3.618)
Household own at least one agricultural machine 0.197 0.226 0.217 0.146
(0.398) (0.418) (0.412) (0.353)
Household’s farming land area 2.999 3.439 3.406 2.004
(9.460) (10.34) (10.20) (7.184)
Individual
Male 0.489 0.534 0.482 0.477
(0.500) (0.499) (0.500) (0.499)
Age 41.98 9.637 39.32 65.31
(20.35) (4.456) (9.774) (8.084)
Prenventive health care 0.0429 0.0600 0.0324 0.0525
(0.203) (0.237) (0.177) (0.223)
Calorie intake 2045.7 1622.5 2204.6 1997.4
(967.0) (662.6) (917.2) (1113.2)
Unhealthy diet 0.662 0.710 0.649 0.658
(0.473) (0.454) (0.477) (0.474)
Household
Raise livestock 0.296 0.365 0.292 0.263
(0.456) (0.481) (0.455) (0.440)
Treated water by water plant 0.554 0.498 0.542 0.608
(0.497) (0.500) (0.498) (0.488)
Have tap water 0.780 0.738 0.776 0.812
(0.414) (0.440) (0.417) (0.391)
Have flush toilets 0.503 0.446 0.503 0.534
(0.500) (0.497) (0.500) (0.499)
Excreta around the house 0.249 0.302 0.237 0.240
(0.432) (0.459) (0.425) (0.427)
Log household income 9.739 9.636 9.820 9.647
(1.165) (1.131) (1.121) (1.250)
Observations 58724 9873 31562 17289
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Table 2.2: Descriptive Statistics: Water Quality by Survey Year 
  
2000 2004 2006 2009 2011 Total
Water Quality
Water pollution index . 3.270 3.148 2.981 2.808 3.044
(.) (1.211) (1.214) (1.010) (0.812) (1.084)
Drinkable water percentage 0.560 0.521 0.490 0.503 0.575 0.528
(0.243) (0.261) (0.199) (0.205) (0.206) (0.224)
Health Status
Sick in recent 4 weeks 0.0645 0.167 0.126 0.137 0.156 0.131
(0.246) (0.373) (0.332) (0.344) (0.363) (0.338)
Have diarrhea in recent 4 weeks 0.00807 0.0259 0.0178 0.0106 0.0112 0.0144
(0.0895) (0.159) (0.132) (0.102) (0.105) (0.119)
Disabled according to IADL score (age 55 and above) 0.292 0.206 0.204 . . 0.228
(0.455) (0.405) (0.403) (.) (.) (0.420)
Height-for-age z-scores(age 17 and under) -0.810 -0.660 -0.602 -0.336 -0.117 -0.518
(1.204) (1.278) (1.327) (1.329) (1.422) (1.335)
BMI z-scores(age 17 and under) -0.286 -0.133 -0.135 -0.143 0.119 -0.119
(1.220) (1.255) (1.359) (1.371) (1.445) (1.333)
BMI(age 18 and above) 22.80 23.06 23.16 23.33 23.87 23.29
(3.260) (3.375) (3.357) (3.478) (3.996) (3.558)
Observations 93957
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Table 2.3: Estimated Effect of Agricultural Water Pollution on Health Post 2006 - Using  
County-Level Water Pollution Index 
  
All age Age 18 and above Age below 18
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Sick Diarrhea BMI BMI Z-Score Height-For-Age Z-Score
Post 2006 X Water Pollution Index -0.000833 0.00316⇤ -0.0266 -0.0246 -0.0357
(0.00460) (0.00182) (0.0223) (0.0410) (0.0362)
Water Pollution Level 0.0305⇤⇤⇤ 0.00641 -0.173⇤⇤⇤ -0.148 -0.0158
(0.00969) (0.00396) (0.0514) (0.0911) (0.0684)
Post 2006 0.131 -0.0716⇤⇤ 0.608 -0.374 0.230
(0.0906) (0.0352) (0.527) (0.555) (0.408)
Individual Fixed E↵ects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 38525 38489 31011 4919 4995
Note: Significant levels are indicated by ⇤⇤⇤ p<0.01, ⇤⇤ p<0.05, ⇤ p<0.1. All results include the following controls: gender, minority
group, age, age squared, preventive medical service, calorie intake, unhealthy diet, livestock raising, tap water access, flush toilet,
excreta near house, log income
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Table 2.4: Estimated Effect of Early Childhood Agricultural Water Pollution Exposure on 
Health - Using County-Level Water Pollution Index 
  
Age 6 and below
(1) (2)
BMI Z-Score Height-For-Age Z-Score
Born after 2006 X Water Pollution Index -0.0817 0.0920
(0.102) (0.0895)
Born after 2006 0.251 -0.0747
(0.330) (0.290)
Water Pollution Index -0.140 -0.0315
(0.178) (0.155)
Year Fixed E↵ects Yes Yes
Community Fixed E↵ects Yes Yes
Observations 1404 1445
Note: Significant levels are indicated by *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. All results include the following controls: gender, minority
group, age, age squared, preventive medical service, calorie intake, unhealthy diet, livestock raising, tap water access, flush toilet,
excreta near house, log income
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Table 2.5: Estimated Effect of Agricultural Water Pollution on Health Based on Access 
to Treated Water - Using  County-Level Water Pollution Index 
  
All age Age 18 and above Age below 18
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Sick Diarrhea BMI BMI Z-Score Height-For-Age Z-Score
Untreated water X Post 2006 X Water Pollution Index 0.0145⇤ 0.00317 -0.0971⇤⇤ 0.0431 -0.0991⇤
(0.00860) (0.00336) (0.0428) (0.0754) (0.0571)
Post 2006 X Water Pollution Index -0.0107⇤ 0.000944 0.0278 -0.0283 0.0122
(0.00592) (0.00229) (0.0295) (0.0506) (0.0462)
Untreated water X Water Pollution Index -0.00753 -0.00106 0.0144 -0.0464 -0.00116
(0.00652) (0.00293) (0.0314) (0.0594) (0.0437)
Untreated Water X Post 2006 -0.0466⇤ -0.00621 0.428⇤⇤⇤ -0.130 0.249
(0.0279) (0.0109) (0.145) (0.244) (0.181)
Untreated Water 0.0178 -0.000176 -0.0520 0.110 -0.0227
(0.0233) (0.0104) (0.114) (0.215) (0.158)
Individual Fixed E↵ects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 38525 38489 31011 4919 4995
Note: Significant levels are indicated by ⇤⇤⇤ p<0.01, ⇤⇤ p<0.05, ⇤ p<0.1. All results include the following controls: gender, minority
group, age, age squared, preventive medical service, calorie intake, unhealthy diet, livestock raising, tap water access, flush toilet,
excreta near house, log income
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Table 2.6: Estimated Effect of Early Childhood Agricultural Water Pollution Exposure on 
Health Based on Access to Treated Water - Using  County-Level Water Pollution Index 
  
Age 6 and below
(1) (2)
BMI Z-Score Height-For-Age Z-Score
Untreated Water X Born after 2006 X Water Pollution Index 0.0923 -0.302⇤
(0.191) (0.182)
Untreated Water X Water Pollution Index -0.0674 -0.00984
(0.129) (0.113)
Born after 2006 X Water Pollution Index -0.123 0.228⇤
(0.145) (0.122)
Untreated Water X Born after 2006 -0.307 0.707
(0.566) (0.542)
Untreated Water 0.153 0.0999
(0.412) (0.342)
Born after 2006 0.381 -0.370
(0.441) (0.372)
Water Pollution Index -0.0967 -0.0205
(0.194) (0.177)
Year Fixed E↵ects Yes Yes
Community Fixed E↵ects Yes Yes
Observations 1404 1445
⇤⇤⇤ p<0.01, ⇤⇤ p<0.05, ⇤ p<0.1
Note: Significant levels are indicated by *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. All results include the following controls: gender, minority
group, age, age squared, preventive medical service, calorie intake, unhealthy diet, livestock raising, tap water access, flush toilet,
excreta near house, log income
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Chapter 3: Better off or Worse off? The Economic Analysis of Income and Pollution 
Effect of China's Agricultural Support Policies 
3.1 Introduction 
With the increasing demand of agricultural products due to its huge population, in 
addition to the enlarging income inequality between rural as China's urbanization 
accelerates, rural development is one of the policy priorities in China from the beginning 
of the 21st century. The main intended goals of China's agricultural support policies 
include increasing the agricultural production, improving rural households' living 
standards, and developing rural economy. Started from 2000, China started the 
agricultural tax reform that aimed at abolishing all the agricultural taxes and fees step by 
step by the end of 2005.  As the second stage of agricultural development policies, in 
2006 the Chinese government implemented a series of agricultural support policies, 
including subsidies to purchase agricultural inputs such as chemical fertilizers and 
pesticides (Lai, 2017). These policies resulted in substantial increases in grain production 
and development of rural economy (Gale, 2013). As part of the series of rural 
development policies, these policies are intended to improve the well-being of rural 
residents. However, as we found in Chapter 2, the increasing use of fertilizers and 
pesticides also resulted in increased water pollution from agricultural activities which 
cause adverse health impacts. Thus, policymakers need a clearer understanding of both 
the positive intended effect and negative unintended effect, and implement more efficient 
polices by incorporating and reducing these negative impacts in the future.   
In a traditional farming household in China, farmers are both consumers and 
producers. As they produce more, their income is higher and they are able to have more 
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consumption, including investment on their health. However, agricultural pollution is 
created during the production process. On a given land, more production means more use 
of pesticides and fertilizers, which also leads to more pollution. As the consumer of the 
goods themselves, farming household bear the externalities from agriculture. Health risk 
of drinking water is larger in rural areas in China, especially for children (Chen et al., 
2016; Su et al.,2013). So it could be the case that better health is caused by more 
agricultural production or the case that worse health is caused by that. 
Water pollution is one of major pollution caused by agricultural production. 
Drinking untreated water causes water-related diseases and harms human health. Some 
researchers focus on estimating the effect of drinking water quality on public health in 
rural area. Mangyo (2008) and Zhang (2012) estimate the causal effect of water access 
and improved water infrastructure on health in China. However, these studies don't have 
real water quality data as a proxy for water pollution exposure. In addition, they don't 
focus on the water pollution caused by agricultural activities. Lai (2017) explores the 
health impact of agricultural pollution by using pesticide intensity as a proxy. But due to 
the lack of water quality related data in his research, the results are not purely water 
pollution impacts.   
Despite agricultural pollution might negatively impact health, increased 
agricultural income could improve the health by investing more on nutrients and medical 
care. Thus, the overall outcome of agricultural production remains uncertain. However, 
some researchers argue that income affect food consumption but not necessarily nutrition 
intake. These findings could be interpreted as that health status is not always positively 
determined by income. Behrman and Deolalikar (1987) argue that high income does not 
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brings high nutrition intake for poor households. While Slavchevska (2015) finds 
evidence that higher long-term effect of agricultural production on nutritional status for 
younger children and higher short-term effect for older children. Pitt and Rosenzweig 
(1985) also find vitamins and minerals affect short-term health as much as calorie does. 
There is no previous literature studying the impact of agricultural pollution on 
health with the disturbance of income effect. First, increases in agricultural production is 
accompany with the increased usage of fertilizers and pesticides. These pollutions 
negatively impact human health through drinking water and food intake. Second, 
increased income from agricultural production make people invest more on nutrition and 
medical care which could improve the health.   
The main objective of this research is to disentangle the income and water 
pollution effects of agricultural support policies on health for both adults and children.  A 
challenge to estimating the health effects of agricultural policies is that household income 
change directly affected by the policies cannot be observed. Moreover, it can be difficult 
to capture variation in water pollution specifically due to agricultural activities. 
Therefore, to obtain exogenous variation in agricultural water pollution and household 
income, I use a quasi-experimental design and exploit a series of agricultural support 
policies enacted in China. These policies were nationwide and exogenous and led to 
dramatic increases in grain production (Lai, 2017). I further employ a difference-in-
difference-in-differences (DDD) framework to examine the differential effect of 
agricultural support policies on farming and non-farming households. Specifically, I look 
at the effect of agricultural water pollution on morbidity, diarrhea incidence, body mass 
index, and height-for-age z-score. To reduce the mixed effects on different health 
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outcome measures, I also predict the overall health index at individual and household 
level from all the observed health measures using factor and principal component 
analysis.   
I find that the agricultural water pollution worsens health outcomes through 
increased incidence of diarrhea and lower body mass index (BMI) and increased 
household income improves health outcomes through decreased incidence of sickness. I 
further find negative pollution effect dominates the positive income effect among 
children, while positive income effect dominates the negative pollution effect among 
adults. Finally, I don't find consistent evidence on the differences in these income and 
pollution effect between farming and non-farming households.  
3.2 Theoretical Model 
3.2.1 Farmer's Profit Maximization Problem 
Assume a farming household's income comes from the net profit from agricultural 
production. The agricultural production requires two inputs: labor and other inputs 
(including seeds, fertilizers, pesticides and tools). Agricultural machines, tools are fixed 
cost that I assume do not impact the household's profit maximization decision. Seeds per 
acreage, total land area, and agricultural products' prices are also assumed constant in this 
simple model.  Thus, the non-labor inputs affect the agricultural revenue are fertilizers 
and pesticides. A household is assumed to maximize their total profit as follows: max[,] 𝐵 = 𝑌 𝐿,𝑁 − 𝑃]𝑁 (1) 
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where 𝐵 is the profit from agricultural production, 𝑌(. ) is the revenue from selling their 
agricultural products, 𝐿 is the labor input for agricultural production, 𝑁 is the non-labor 
inputs for agricultural production. 𝑃] is the price set of non-labor inputs. 
Profit maximization requires the marginal benefit of non-labor inputs 𝑌] is equal 
to the marginal cost of non-labor inputs 𝑃].	Here we assume 𝑌 is concave with a 
diminishing return, that is 𝑑𝑌𝑑𝑁 decreases as 𝑁 increases. When subsidies apply to the non-
labor inputs, the actual cost of non-labor inputs 𝑃] decreases. To achieve the optimal 
solution by decreasing the marginal benefit, the rational farming household increases 𝑁 
so that 𝑌 and 𝐵 also increase. 
3.2.2  Impact of Agricultural Subsidies on Health 
A simple health production function is denoted as the following: 𝐻 = 𝐻(𝐷, 𝑋', 𝑋f) (2) 
where	𝐻 is the health status, 𝐷 is the environmental pollution caused by fertilizer and 
pesticide application.  𝑋' is the vector of health inputs and health behaviors under the 
control of individuals, 𝑋f is the vector of non-controllable individual and household 
conditions that affect health, in other words, is exogenous. 
Agricultural pollution is a function of non-labor agricultural inputs 𝑁:  𝐷 = 𝐷(𝑁) (3) 
To maximize the agricultural profit 𝐵, under the constant 𝐿 level, the optimal non-
labor inputs levels are determined by the prices of non-labor inputs. Thus, the optimal 
non-labor input should be a function of the unit cost of the input: 𝑁∗ = 𝑁(𝑃]) (4) 
Substitute Equation (4) into Equation (3), a reduced form of pollution function is: 
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𝐷 = 𝐷(𝑃]) (5) 
Health Investment 𝑋' is assumed to be a function of household income 𝐵. 
Substitute Equations (1) and (4) into 𝑋', such that: 𝑋' = 𝑋'(𝑌(𝑃])) (6) 
Then, substitute Equation (4) into Equation (3) and Equation (2), a reduced form 
of my research question is: 𝐻 = 𝐻 𝐷 𝑃] , 𝑋' 𝑌(𝑃] , 𝑋f) (7) 
To explore the impact of agricultural subsidies on health outcomes, I differentiate 
Equation (7) with respect to 𝑃], such that: 𝜕𝐻𝜕𝑃] = 𝜕𝐻𝜕𝐷 ∙ 𝜕𝐷𝜕𝑃] + 𝜕𝐻𝜕𝑋' ∙ 𝜕𝑋'𝜕𝑌 ∙ 𝜕𝑌𝜕𝑃] (8) 
The total health effect of agricultural subsidy policy in Equation (8) consists of 
two parts. The first term on the right-hand side is interpreted as the externality of the 
input subsidies which is expected to be negative as the fact that environmental pollution 
worsens human health. The second term indicates the wealth effect of the subsidies that 
lead to higher household income and more investment on health improvement, which is 
expected be to positive. The sign of the total effect remains ambiguous, and this paper 
focuses on the analysis of the first term, that is, the impact from environmental damage 
caused by agricultural subsidies.  
3.3 Data 
To explore the relationship between agricultural policies and health through 
change in income and water pollution, I exploit unique longitudinal household data and 
merge it with longitudinal data on water quality. I am thus able to connect variation in 
observed levels of agricultural water pollution to individual-level health outcomes. This 
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allows us to improve upon previous research which proxies for water pollution exposure 
with water source type (Mangyo, 2008; Zhang, 2012; Zhang and Xu, 2016) or with the 
interaction of water source type and regional-level pesticide use (Lai, 2017).  
3.3.1 China Health and Nutrition Survey (CHNS) 
My household data come from the China Health and Nutrition Survey (CHNS). 
The CHNS is a rich longitudinal data set that follows approximately 4,400 households 
with around 19,000 individuals over nine survey waves in the years 1989, 1993, 1997, 
2000, 2004, 2006, 2009, and 2011.6 The surveys cover both rural and urban areas in nine 
Chinese provinces from 1989 to 2009 with three additional provinces included in the 
2011 wave. My primary water quality data began in 2004. Therefore, I focus on CHNS 
data collected in the 2004, 2006, 2009 and 2011 survey waves.   
I only include the 8 provinces and exclude the 3 newly added provinces in the 
2011 survey in order to exploit the panel. I also exclude Guizhou province because there 
are no water quality monitoring sites there during the study period. The 8 provinces in my 
study are located in the Northeast, East, Middle and Southwest parts of China. These 
provinces are representative of China and are diverse in terms of geographic location, 
economic development, population, urban to rural ratio, agricultural intensity, and water 
availability.   
The CHNS collects extensive information at the individual- and household-level, 
particularly with regards to health and nutrition. In every survey round, information on 
morbidity and anthropometric measurements were collected for all sample individuals 
																																								 																				
6 The number of observed households and individuals vary across survey waves as the project also follows 
households formed out of sample households.  
	49	
	
making these data uniquely suited towards examining health in China. The specific health 
measures I examine are whether or not the respondent reported being sick or having 
diarrhea in the last four weeks, adult body mass index (BMI), child BMI-for-age z-scores 
(BMIZ), and child height-for-age z-scores (HAZ). 
Table 3.1 reports the descriptive statistics from my study sample across age 
groups. 15.6% of individuals in my sample reported being sick in the last 4 weeks, while 
only 1.91% of them had diarrhea during that time. Children younger than 18 years have 
the lower sickness and diarrhea rate. Children are usually considered to be more 
vulnerable with respect to their health. The low sickness rate among children may 
indicate the high value placed on children in China due to its one-child policy, evidenced 
by the fact that children received the higher rate of preventive health care than adults. 
The average maximum individual farming months are 7.192 months, and children 
on average work a little bit longer in months than adults.  Descriptive statistics by waves 
are summarized in Table 3.2. Sickness and diarrhea incidence is much higher in the post-
2000 waves than in the 2000 wave, but both measures fluctuate across waves. The 
anthropometric measurements BMI, BMI z-scores and height-for-age z-scores exhibit an 
increasing trend over time. 
3.3.2 Household Income Data 
Both Table 3.1 and Table 3.2 record the summary statistics of different income 
measures. All the income measures in this research are the logarithm of the actual income 
inflated to year 2015. Per capital income is the income divided by the family size. 
Farming income only include the net income from farming, while the total income 
includes all the household income including the government subsidies.  
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The theory part of this research assumes the agricultural support policies lead to 
changes in both household income and water pollution level. Table 3.2 shows the 
increasing trend of all the income measures over time. Figure 3.1 plots the sample 
average of per capita household income over the survey period. I split the data sample 
into two groups, farming households are shown in the blue and non-farming households 
are illustrated in red. In the first survey year 2009 after the 2006 policy year, the de-trend 
per capita household income in farming households exceeds the de-trend per capita 
household income in non-farming households which support our income increase 
assumption.  
3.3.3 Water Quality Data 
My water quality data come from two sources. The primary data I use in my main 
analysis is measured from water monitoring sites throughout the country by China's 
Ministry of Environmental Protection. At each of these sites, water pollutants were 
recorded weekly including surface water levels of chemical oxygen demand (COD), 
dissolved oxygen (DO), and nitrogen in hydrazoic acid. These measurements were then 
used to generate a water quality grade index ranging from 1 to 6. This index increases 
with pollution level, thus a higher grade represents lower water quality. An index higher 
than 3 means the water cannot be used for drinking purpose. From this point forward, I 
will refer to the water quality index as the water pollution index for clarity.   
To join with my household data at the county-level, I calculate the annual mean 
value of the water pollution index. I then assign each county in the sample provinces the 
annual mean water pollution index measured at the monitoring sites nearest to the county 
centroid. These measures were then linked with the CHNS data at the county-level. 
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County is a level 3 administrative division in China, which is smaller than province and 
prefecture. The water pollution index is my main treatment variable of interest.  
Table 3.2 also reports the mean and standard deviation of my water quality 
measures in the sample provinces. Drinkable water percentage is lowest in 2006, and the 
water pollution index exhibits a decreasing trend. Nonetheless, the average water 
pollution index hovers around 3 for the duration of the sample period indicating that 
much of the water in sample provinces is unsafe to drink. Figure 3.2 plots the water 
pollution index (Panel a) and drinkable water percentage (Panel b) over the survey period 
de-trended by year. In Figure 3.2, I clearly see reductions in water quality during the first 
few years after the implementation of agricultural support policies after  2005-2006. In 
particular, the water pollution index peaks in 2006 when the input subsidies were 
introduced. This supports my hypothesis that water quality worsened due to increased 
agricultural activities.  
3.4 Empirical Model 
In order to explore the health benefits brought from China’s agricultural support 
policies, the first step I’m interested in taking is to explore the farmer’s behavior change 
as well as income change because they are potential channels for these policies to 
improve the rural health. After understanding the income change impacted by the 
policies, I use both the variation in income and water pollution change caused by polices 
to disentangle the income and pollution effects on health outcomes. Finally, I am 
interested in looking at the difference in both of these impacts between farming and non-
farming households.  
	52	
	
3.4.1 Impact on Farmer's Producing Behavior 
First, I am interested in the farmers' producing behavior change after the 
implementation of agricultural support policies starting from 2006. As labor is an 
important input for agricultural production, the change in labor input also indicates the 
change in other inputs, such as fertilizer and pesticide. In addition, the labor is also 
associated with household income or wealth. To examine the impact of agricultural 
support policies on farmers' labor inputs on farming, I adopt a before-after comparison 
econometric model as follows: 
 𝐹𝑎𝑟𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑔'( = 𝛽+, + 𝛽,,𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡2006'( + 𝛽7,𝑋'( + 𝜆( + 𝜇' + 𝜀'( (9) 
Equation (9) models the household and individual 𝑖 's farming labor input at 
survey wave 𝑡. The farming labor input we examine, 𝐹𝑎𝑟𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑔'(, include: maximum 
individual farming months at household level, annual individual farming hours, and 
annual individual farming months. Since not each individual in the farming household 
does the farming work, I use the highest individual farming months in a household to 
represent the household farming months. Both farming months and farming hours are 
measures of labor inputs. Farming hours are the actual work time on farming and are 
directly associated with other non-labor inputs. While farming months' change indicate 
the farming structure change as the fixed agricultural seasonality. For example, the 
increase in farming months might be caused by choosing a different portfolio of farming 
products.  𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡2006'( is a policy indicator that equal to 1 if the survey was conducted 
after 2006.  𝛽,, from Equation (9) is therefore interpreted as the difference in the farming 
labor inputs after the policy. 𝑋'( include household and individual controls, such as log 
household income, individual daily calorie intake, unhealthy diet (=1 if diet is not 
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healthy7), whether the individual uses preventive health care, household sanitation 
conditions, age, gender, and ethnic group (=1 if belong to ethnic minorities). 𝜆( is the 
year trend and 𝜇' is a vector of individual or household fixed effects. 		
3.4.2 Impact on Household Income 
Next, I am interested in exploring the impact of agricultural policies on household 
income. According to the theory base of this research, income effect is the positive 
impact that improve human health through more investment in nutrition and health. To 
demonstrate the validity of this income effect, I use a before-after comparison 
econometric model as follows: 
 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒'( = 𝛽+7 + 𝛽,7𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡2006'( + 𝛽77𝑋'( + 𝜆( + 𝜇' + 𝜀'( (10) 
Equation (10) models the household and individual 𝑖 's income at survey wave 𝑡. 
This analysis not only looks at the farming individuals and households, but also considers 
the possible spillover impact on the rural and urban areas. 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒'( include household 
income, per capita household income and individual income. 𝛽77 from Equation (10) is 
therefore interpreted as the difference in the income after the policy implementation. 
As farming households are more likely to be affected by agricultural support 
policies, I further examine the heterogeneous effects across farming and non-farming 
households. 
 
𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒'( = 𝛽+8 + 𝛽,8𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡2006'(×𝐹𝑎𝑟𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑔𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦'(+ 𝛽78𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡2006'( + 𝛽88𝐹𝑎𝑟𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑔𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦'(+ 𝛽98𝑋'( + 𝜆( + 𝜇' + 𝜀'( (11) 
																																								 																				
7 According to the US recommendations on dietary reference intake for total energy (Institute of 
Medicine, 2005), I define unhealthy diet as having at least one of three macronutrients out of the 
US dietary reference intake range. 
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𝐹𝑎𝑟𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑔𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦'( equals 1 if the household or individual 𝑖 at year 𝑡 works on 
farming. 𝛽,8from Equation (11) is therefore the income difference between the farming 
and non-farming households after the policy implementation. 
3.4.3 Impact on Health 
 The main objective of this research is to identify the impact of policies on human 
health. The net impact can be disentangled to income effect and pollution effect. To 
explore the two effects simultaneously, I use a quasi-experimental design by interacting 
water quality and per capita household income with the 2006 agricultural supporting 
policies.  
 
𝐻𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑡ℎ'( = 𝛽+9 + 𝛽,9𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡2006'(×𝑊𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑟'( + 𝛽79𝑊𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑟'(+ 𝛽89𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡2006'( + 𝛽99𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡2006'(×𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒'(+ 𝛽U9𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒'( + 𝛽V9𝑋'( + 𝜆( + 𝜇' + 𝜀'( (12) 
Equation (12) models the health outcome of individual 𝑖 at survey wave 𝑡. The 
health outcomes we examine, 𝐻𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑡ℎ'(, include: a dummy variable indicating whether 
the individual was sick in the last 4 weeks, had diarrhea in the last 4 weeks, adult BMI 
(for individuals aged 18 and above), child BMI-for-age  z-score (for individuals aged 
below 18), and child Height-for-age z-score (for individuals aged below 18).  County-
level water pollution exposure for individual 𝑖 at survey wave 𝑡 is captured by 𝑊𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑟'(. I 
use the annual average water pollution index, calculated as the mean value at the nearest 
monitoring site to individual 𝑖 at year 𝑡 to measure water quality - the higher the value the 
worse the water quality.  
Equation (12) allows us to estimate the impact difference of income and water 
quality on health before and after the agricultural subsidy policy starting from 2006 at the 
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same time. 𝛽,9 from Equation (12) captures the difference in the impact of water quality 
on health after the policy, while 𝛽99 captures the difference in the impact of income on 
health after the policy. 
3.4.4 Factor and Principal Component Analysis 
The above analysis considers multiple health measures as health outcome 
variable. However, the income and pollution effect might have different magnitude on 
different health indicators. Thus, it might cause difficulties on drawing a conclusion on 
the health impacts.  
I use factor and Principal Component Analysis methods to predict a health index 
that corporates all the health measures I use in the above analysis. And then I replace the 
health outcome variables with the predicted health index as follows: 
 
𝐻𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑡ℎ𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥'(= 	𝛽+U + 𝛽,U𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡2006'(×𝑊𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑟'( + 𝛽7U𝑊𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑟'(+ 𝛽8U𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡2006'( + 𝛽9U𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡2006'(×𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒'(+ 𝛽UU𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒'( + 𝛽VU𝑋'( + 𝜆( + 𝜇' + 𝜀'( 
(13) 
𝐻𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑡ℎ𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥'( is the predicted health index of individual or household 𝑖 at 
survey wave 𝑡. 𝛽,U and 𝛽9U are variables of interest that capture the impact of policies on 
overall health.  
3.4.5  Further Analysis 
Farming households are closer to the pollution source as well as directly 
motivated by the agricultural support policies.  Therefore, I apply a Difference-in-
Difference-in-Differences (DDD) design to look at the heterogeneous effects across 
farming and non-farming households. This allows us to explore the difference in the 
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health impact of water pollution and household income due to the household's farming 
status.  
 
𝐻𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑡ℎ'( = 𝛽+V + 𝛽,V𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡2006'(×𝑊𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑟'(×𝐹𝑎𝑟𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑔'(+ 𝛽7V𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡2006'(×𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒'(×𝐹𝑎𝑟𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑔'(+ 𝛽8V𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡2006'(×𝑊𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑟'(+ 𝛽9V𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡2006'(×𝐹𝑎𝑟𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑔'(+ 𝛽UV𝑊𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑟'(×𝐹𝑎𝑟𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑔'(+ 𝛽VV𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡2006'(×𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒'(+ 𝛽WV𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒'(×𝐹𝑎𝑟𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑔'( + 𝛽XV𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡2006'(+ 𝛽rV𝑊𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑟'( + 𝛽,+V 𝐹𝑎𝑟𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑔'(+ 𝛽,,V 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒'( + 𝛽,7V 𝑋'( + 𝜆( + 𝜇' 
(14) 
𝐹𝑎𝑟𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑔'( equals 1 if the household individual 𝑖 lives in a farming household at 
year 𝑡. 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒'( is the per capita household income of individual 𝑖 at year 𝑡. 𝛽,V from 
Equation (14) then estimates the difference in the effect of post-2006 water pollution on 
individuals in or not in the farming households. 𝛽7V examines the difference in the effect 
of post-2006 household income change on individuals in or not in the farming 
households. 
3.5 Results 
3.5.1 The Effect of Agricultural Support Policies on Household Income 
Table 3.3 reports the estimates from Equation (9) on the effect of 2006 
agricultural support policies on farming activities. Column (1) reports the effect of 
policies on the household-level farming activities, which is represented by the maximum 
individual farming months in the household. Columns (2) and (3) report the effect of 
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policies on individual farming activities, which are represented by the annual farming 
hours and annual farming months. Although not reported in Table 3.3, all estimates are 
estimated with robust standard errors and include all controls, individual or household 
fixed effects, and year trend. The individual fixed effects control for time-invariant 
characteristics that are correlated with water quality and health, such as genetic diseases, 
birth defects, individual behaviors, and household environment as well as other pollution 
sources, sanitation conditions and health infrastructure.  The year trend captures the time-
variant characteristics that affect farming activities.  
The coefficient on the variable Post2006 captures the conditional average 
difference in household and individual farming activities before and after 2006. It can 
therefore be interpreted as the effect of agricultural support policies on the farming labor 
input since I am identifying this effect of variation in farming behaviors resulting from 
these policies. For example, in Column (1), I see that on average households spend more 
months on farming over time in that the post-2006 period is associated with a 1.062 
months' increase in the largest individual farming months in the same household. In 
Column (2), I also find evidence that on average individuals spend more hours annually 
on farming over time in that the post-2006 period is associated with a 41.09 hours' 
increase in the annual individual annual farming hours. However, I don't find significant 
change in individual annual farming months, which can be explained by the fact the 
individuals tend to spending more hours in the fixed farming months rather than 
expanding the farming months of a year. 
Instead of examining the average farming time change due to the agricultural 
policies, in Table 3.4 I examine the effect of 2006 agricultural support policies on income 
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based on Equation (10). In the first panel of Table 3.4, I examine the effect of the polices 
on the income of farming households, including household farming income, per capita 
household farming income, household total income, per capita household total income. I 
consider both farming income and total income because other non-farming income might 
also be affected by these policies indirectly. While household income is the measure of 
household wealth, per capita household income is used more widely in the economics 
literature as it captures the family size and living standard. In the next three panels I also 
analyze the household and individual level income change in rural, urban, and all 
households. In the last panel, I explore the income difference of farming individuals on 
both farming and total income.  
I find on average household total income, per capita household income, and 
individual total income is increasing significantly over time after 2006, which happens 
not only in the farming households, but also other rural and urban households. It is also 
interesting to notice the average increase in rural households is higher than the average 
increase in farming and urban households, which indicates the non-farming income in 
rural area benefits most from the policies. Since subsidies are part of the non-farming 
income and these polices have huge spill-over effect on overall rural economy, this 
phenomenon is also reasonable. On the contrast, the pure farming income is decreasing 
over time after 2006, meaning the farming itself doesn't bring wealth to the households. 
However, as the assumption of this research lies on the fact of total income increase, this 
unfortunate finding doesn't really impact the foundation of this research.  
In order to further detect the income change difference between farming and non-
farming households, Table 3.5 reports the estimation results of Equation (11). Columns 
	59	
	
(1) – (2) report the estimated income change difference at household level, including the 
household total income and per capita household total income. Column (3) reports the 
estimated income change difference at individual level. The primary coefficient of 
interest is that interaction between Post2006 and the farming status indicator. This is the 
effect on income difference between farming and non-farming households or individuals 
that occurred after the agricultural support policies were implemented. In Columns (1) 
and (2), I see that on average farming households' income is increasing faster than non-
farming households over time in that the post-2006 period is associated with a 0.0757% 
increase in total income and 0.0687% increase in per capita total income. However, 
Column (3) shows farming individuals' total income is increasing slower than non-
farming individuals. These findings again indicate that although farming households have 
higher income increase than non-farming households due to the agricultural support 
policies, this income increase is mostly from non-farming source.  
3.5.2 The Effect of Agricultural Support Policies on Health Outcomes: Income 
Effect and Pollution Effect 
As evidence shows the income is increasing in the post-2006 years, it is valid to 
discuss both the income and pollution effect on health caused by the agricultural support 
polices simultaneously using a quasi-experimental design. The results reported in Table 
3.6 based on Equation (12), capture the income effect of policies and the pollution effect 
of polices due to both contaminated drinking water as well as reduced food safety on a 
variety of health outcomes. Columns (1) - (2) of Table 3.6 report health effect on the 
incidence of sickness and diarrhea in people of all ages in my sample. Column (3) of 
Table 3.6 reports the estimated effect on BMI for adults (aged 18 and older).  Columns 
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(4) - (5) of Table 3.6 focus on children and report the estimated effects on BMI-for-age z-
score and Height-for-age z-score (HAZ) for children under the age of 18 in my sample. 
The coefficient on the water pollution index alone captures the association between levels 
of pollution and health conditional on control variables and individual and time fixed 
effects, while the coefficient on the per capita household total income captures the 
association between income and health.  The coefficient on the variable Post2006 
captures the conditional average difference in health before and after 2006. The 
interaction between Post2006 and water pollution index is known as the pollution effect, 
is the effect on health outcomes from changes in the water pollution index that occurred 
after the agricultural support policies were implemented. The interaction between 
Post2006 and per capita household total income, known as the income effect, is the effect 
on health outcomes from changes in the household income that occurred after the 
agricultural support policies were implemented.  In Columns (2) and (3), I see that on 
average individuals are unhealthier over time due to the water pollution in that the post-
2006 period is associated with a 0.310% increase in diarrhea incidence and a 3.77% 
decrease in adult BMI. In Column (1), I find on average individuals are healthier over 
time due to the increasing household income in that the post-2006 period is associated 
with a 1.12% decrease in sickness. In other words, water pollution has significant 
negative effect on health outcomes such as diarrhea and adult BMI, while income has 
significant positive effect on reducing the sickness. However, the other estimates of both 
effects are insignificant and in mixed signs, there might be some other factors affect 
different health outcomes that cannot be observed in this data.  
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To reduce the impact of unobserved health factors on different health outcomes, 
one of the ways is to create a comprehensive health index based on all the health outcome 
variables. I am using both factor analysis and principal analysis to predict a health index 
for each individual according to his or her observed health outcome variables used for 
Table 3.6. Table 3.7 shows the results using predicted health index from factor analysis, 
and Table 3.8 shows the results using predicted health index from principal component 
analysis. I predict adult health index using sickness, diarrhea incidence and adult BMI 
and children health index using sickness, diarrhea incidence, BMI-for-age z-score and 
Height-for-age z-score (HAZ). Since the predicted health index has the same sign as the 
sickness and diarrhea sickness and opposite sign as the anthropometric measures, I name 
it predicted sickness index for easier interpretation. The higher the predicted sickness 
index, the unhealthier the individuals are. The odd numbered columns are controlled for 
year fixed effects, while the even numbered columns are not. The upper panel of both 
Table 3.7 and Table 3.8 are individual level results, and the lower panel are average 
individual effects at household level.  
In Table 3.7, individual adults have significant larger negative health effects of 
water pollution after 2006 and significant positive health effect of household income after 
2006. I also find household-level children have significant larger negative health effects 
of water pollution after 2006 and significant positive health effect of household income 
after 2006. These findings are consistent as my assumption that the policies have positive 
income effect and negative pollution effect on human health.  
Table 3.8 using principal component analysis gives us similar but more significant 
results, especially on the individual children's pollution effects. From these two tables, it 
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is interesting to note that the magnitude of average income effect is slightly higher than 
the average pollution effect among adults, while the magnitude of average income effect 
is slightly lower than the average pollution effect among children. This finding indicates 
different age groups are affected differently by the policies. For children, the negative 
pollution impact exceeds the positive income effect, and might have a net negative health 
effect of agricultural support policies. 
3.5.3 Health Effect Difference in Farming and Non-Farming Households 
In Table 3.9, I estimate Equation (14), respectively, which employs a DDD design 
to compare the effect of agricultural water pollution and per capita household income 
increase on a variety of health measures between farming and non-farming households. 
In this case, my primary coefficients of interest are that on the triple interaction of water 
pollution, an indicator for the post-2006 period, and an indicator for household farming 
status and the triple interaction of per capita household income, an indicator for the post-
2006 period, and an indicator for household farming status.  These estimate then 
measures the difference in the income effect and pollution effect of policies on health 
outcomes between farming and non-farming households. All results are estimated with 
robust standard errors and include all controls and individual and year fixed effects. 
According to the results reported in Table 3.9, for those live in farming 
households, agricultural water pollution significantly decreases adult BMI. A one-unit 
increase in the water pollution index results in a 0.137 reduction in adult BMI on average 
than non-farming households.  In addition, farming households have higher likelihood of 
being sick in the last 4 weeks from income effect than non-farming households. The 
mixed results don't draw any conclusion on the difference in the impacts between farming 
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and non-farming households. One explanation may be that non-farming households 
invest more than farming households with the same amount of income increase.  
3.6 Conclusion  
Agricultural pollution is a severe problem and threatens public health in rural 
China. The major objective of this paper is to explore both the positive and negative 
impacts of agricultural support policies on human health using longitudinal data. The first 
part of this research focus on the policy impact analysis of agricultural support policies 
on famers' farming activities and income by utilizing before-after comparison and natural 
experiment method. Regression results show that the policies has positive impact on 
farming labor input and income. The second part of this paper is to estimate the health 
impact of water pollution and income affected by the policies. I find that income effect 
dominates among adults, while the pollution effect dominates among children.  
Our results indicate that although the agricultural support policies improve the 
household income and further improve health through the income channel, the negative 
impact brought from agricultural water pollution mitigate the positive impact on human 
health, especially children’s health. Given the findings, I think it is critical for 
policymakers to incorporate the pollution effects into the policy evaluations and make 
environmental friendly policies in the future.  
This research has a lot of limitations. The water quality data might not perfectly 
capture the households' drinking water pollution level. The income change might not 
capture the change in the real health investment and avoidance behavior. Some unknown 
factors associated with the polices might also affect the health outcomes.  
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Figure 3.1: Per Capita Household Income 
 
(a) Per Capita Household Income 
 
(b) De-trend Per Capita Household Income 
Note: Per capita household income is affected by multiple factors and has a clear 
increasing time trend over time. De-trending per capita household income allows us 
to explore the fluctuations of household income that were possibly caused by 
agricultural policies. The y axis in these two graphs is the deflated per capita 
household income across the data sample.  
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Figure 3.2: De-trend Water Quality 
 
(a) De-trend Water Pollution Index (Higher Means Worse) 
 
 
(b) De-trend Drinkable Water Percentage (Higher Means Better) 
 
Note:	Water quality is affected by multiple factors and has a clear decreasing time 
trend since the beginning of the 21st century. De-trending water quality allows us to 
explore the fluctuations of water quality that were possibly caused by agricultural 
policies. The y axis in these two graphs is the annual average water quality data of the 
8 study provinces. 
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Table 3.1: Descriptive Statistics by Age Groups 
  
All Age Age below 18 Age 18 and above
Farming Status
Maximum individual farming months in the household 7.192 7.546 7.144
(3.264) (3.296) (3.262)
Household own at least one agricultural machine 0.409 0.404 0.408
(0.492) (0.492) (0.491)
Household’s farming land area 7.795 6.317 7.986
(13.25) (10.16) (13.62)
Individual
Male 0.502 0.546 0.491
(0.500) (0.499) (0.500)
Age 45.69 14.25 46.59
(13.10) (2.441) (12.40)
Prenventive health care 0.0164 0.0219 0.0164
(0.127) (0.147) (0.127)
Calorie intake 2301.0 2034.3 2304.0
(714.7) (563.7) (718.0)
Unhealthy diet 0.705 0.760 0.701
(0.456) (0.429) (0.458)
Individual Farming Income 7.704 6.218 7.749
(1.118) (1.580) (1.088)
Individual Total Income 8.641 6.778 8.698
(1.154) (1.554) (1.110)
Household
Raise livestock 0.624 0.749 0.620
(0.484) (0.435) (0.485)
Treated water by water plant 0.256 0.224 0.255
(0.437) (0.418) (0.436)
Have tap water 0.582 0.481 0.589
(0.493) (0.501) (0.492)
Have flush toilets 0.146 0.169 0.146
(0.353) (0.376) (0.353)
Excreta around the house 0.464 0.596 0.457
(0.499) (0.492) (0.498)
Household Total Income 9.790 9.647 9.805
(0.910) (0.839) (0.910)
Per Capita Household Total Income 8.481 8.112 8.508
(0.933) (0.855) (0.931)
Household Farming Income 8.467 8.400 8.472
(0.909) (0.869) (0.915)
Per Capita Household Farming Income 7.157 6.864 7.175
(0.964) (0.888) (0.972)
Health Status
Sick in recent 4 weeks 0.156 0.115 0.159
(0.363) (0.320) (0.366)
Have diarrhea in recent 4 weeks 0.0191 0.0164 0.0191
(0.137) (0.127) (0.137)
BMI z-score -0.632
(0.966)
Height-for-age z-score -1.202
(1.063)
BMI 22.84
(3.303)
Observations 11385 183 10442
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Table 3.2: Descriptive Statistics by Survey Year 
  
2000 2004 2006 2009 2011 Total
Water Quality
Water pollution index . 3.270 3.148 2.981 2.808 3.044
(.) (1.211) (1.214) (1.010) (0.812) (1.084)
Drinkable water percentage 0.560 0.521 0.490 0.503 0.575 0.528
(0.243) (0.261) (0.199) (0.205) (0.206) (0.224)
Income Status
Individual Farming Income 7.214 7.765 7.834 7.823 8.035 7.673
(1.048) (1.057) (1.011) (1.176) (1.166) (1.131)
Individual Total Income 8.533 8.660 8.924 9.400 9.681 9.061
(1.151) (1.289) (1.294) (1.156) (1.082) (1.272)
Household Total Income 9.608 9.732 9.772 10.17 10.34 9.955
(1.018) (1.031) (1.093) (1.098) (1.119) (1.115)
Per Capita Household Total Income 8.276 8.484 8.530 8.943 9.125 8.704
(0.986) (1.042) (1.112) (1.098) (1.126) (1.125)
Household Farming Income 8.163 8.512 8.541 8.410 8.469 8.425
(0.812) (0.854) (0.853) (0.968) (1.085) (0.933)
Per Capita Household Farming Income 6.731 7.147 7.180 7.055 7.127 7.056
(0.820) (0.902) (0.895) (1.025) (1.189) (0.993)
Health Status
Sick in recent 4 weeks 0.0645 0.167 0.126 0.137 0.156 0.131
(0.246) (0.373) (0.332) (0.344) (0.363) (0.338)
Have diarrhea in recent 4 weeks 0.00807 0.0259 0.0178 0.0106 0.0112 0.0144
(0.0895) (0.159) (0.132) (0.102) (0.105) (0.119)
Height-for-age z-scores(age 17 and under) -0.810 -0.660 -0.602 -0.336 -0.117 -0.518
(1.204) (1.278) (1.327) (1.329) (1.422) (1.335)
BMI z-scores(age 17 and under) -0.286 -0.133 -0.135 -0.143 0.119 -0.119
(1.220) (1.255) (1.359) (1.371) (1.445) (1.333)
BMI(age 18 and above) 22.80 23.06 23.16 23.33 23.87 23.29
(3.260) (3.375) (3.357) (3.478) (3.996) (3.558)
Observations 93957
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Table 3.3: Estimated Effect of 2006 Policy on Farming Activities 
	 	
Households Individuals
(1) (2) (3)
Maximum Individual Farming Months in the Household Annual Farming Hours Farming Months Per Year
Post 2006 1.062⇤⇤⇤ 41.09⇤⇤⇤ -0.0230
(0.0442) (4.779) (0.0928)
Individual Fixed E↵ects Yes Yes Yes
Year Trend Yes Yes Yes
Observations 76122 18780 19695
⇤⇤⇤ p<0.01, ⇤⇤ p<0.05, ⇤ p<0.1, + p<0.15
Notes: All results include the following controls: gender, minority group, age, age squared, preventive medical service, calorie intake,
unhealthy diet, livestock raising, tap water access, flush toilet, excreta near house
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Table 3.4: Estimated Effect of 2006 Agricultural Support Policies on Income 
	 	
Farming Households
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Household Farming Income Per Capita Household Farming Income Household Total Income Per Capita Household Total Income
Post 2006 -0.165⇤⇤⇤ -0.188⇤⇤⇤ 0.295⇤⇤⇤ 0.273⇤⇤⇤
(0.0164) (0.0170) (0.0162) (0.0161)
Individual Fixed E↵ects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Trend Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 37586 37583 38215 38212
Rural Households
(1) (2) (3)
Household Total Income Per Capita Household Total Income Individual Total Income
Post 2006 0.344⇤⇤⇤ 0.316⇤⇤⇤ 0.604⇤⇤⇤
(0.0157) (0.0156) (0.0257)
Individual Fixed E↵ects Yes Yes Yes
Year Trend Yes Yes Yes
Observations 42010 42007 26955
Urban Households
(1) (2) (3)
Household Total Income Per Capita Household Total Income Individual Total Income
Post 2006 0.287⇤⇤⇤ 0.248⇤⇤⇤ 0.278⇤⇤⇤
(0.0182) (0.0177) (0.0209)
Individual Fixed E↵ects Yes Yes Yes
Year Trend Yes Yes Yes
Observations 38897 38892 24335
All Households
(1) (2) (3)
Household Total Income Per Capita Household Total Income Individual Total Income
Post 2006 0.318⇤⇤⇤ 0.285⇤⇤⇤ 0.465⇤⇤⇤
(0.0119) (0.0117) (0.0171)
Individual Fixed E↵ects Yes Yes Yes
Year Trend Yes Yes Yes
Observations 80907 80899 51290
Farming Individuals
(1) (2)
Individual Farming Income Individual Total Income
Post 2006 -0.102⇤⇤⇤ 0.465⇤⇤⇤
(0.0299) (0.0171)
Individual Fixed E↵ects Yes Yes
Year Trend Yes Yes
Observations 19076 51290
⇤⇤⇤ p<0.01, ⇤⇤ p<0.05, ⇤ p<0.1, + p<0.15
Notes: All results include the following controls: gender, minority group, age, age squared, preventive medical service, calorie intake,
unhealthy diet, livestock raising, tap water access, flush toilet, excreta near house
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Table 3.5: Estimated Effect of 2006 Policy on Income Based on Farming or Not 
	
Households Individuals
(1) (2) (3)
Household Total Income Per Capita Household Total Income Individual Total Income
Farming Household * Post2006 0.0757⇤⇤⇤ 0.0687⇤⇤⇤
(0.0191) (0.0188)
Post 2006 0.288⇤⇤⇤ 0.258⇤⇤⇤ 0.476⇤⇤⇤
(0.0135) (0.0132) (0.0183)
Farming Household 0.0684⇤⇤⇤ 0.0589⇤⇤⇤
(0.0134) (0.0131)
Farming Individual * Post2006 -0.0855⇤⇤⇤
(0.0270)
Farming Individual 0.204⇤⇤⇤
(0.0207)
Individual Fixed E↵ects Yes Yes Yes
Year Trend Yes Yes Yes
Observations 80907 80899 51290
⇤⇤⇤ p<0.01, ⇤⇤ p<0.05, ⇤ p<0.1, + p<0.15
Notes: All results include the following controls: gender, minority group, age, age squared, preventive medical service, calorie intake,
unhealthy diet, livestock raising, tap water access, flush toilet, excreta near house
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Table 3.6: Estimated Effect of 2006 Policy on Health Based on Water Quality and 
Income 
	
All age Age 18 and above Age below 18
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Sick Diarrhea BMI BMI Z-Score Height-For-Age Z-Score
Post 2006 X Water Pollution Level 0.000427 0.00310⇤ -0.0377⇤ -0.0418 -0.0290
(0.00462) (0.00184) (0.0226) (0.0411) (0.0362)
Water Pollution Level 0.0292⇤⇤⇤ 0.00668⇤ -0.166⇤⇤⇤ -0.141+ -0.0183
(0.00968) (0.00396) (0.0512) (0.0912) (0.0684)
Post 2006 0.161⇤⇤⇤ -0.0137 0.153 -0.458 0.432
(0.0443) (0.0178) (0.220) (0.402) (0.310)
Post 2006 X Per Capita Household Income -0.0104⇤⇤ -0.000212 -0.0271 0.0531 -0.0249
(0.00479) (0.00198) (0.0237) (0.0451) (0.0349)
Per Capita Household Total Income 0.0112⇤⇤⇤ 0.000840 0.0417⇤⇤ -0.0316 0.0146
(0.00400) (0.00165) (0.0192) (0.0346) (0.0263)
Individual Fixed E↵ects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 38525 38489 31011 4919 4995
⇤⇤⇤ p<0.01, ⇤⇤ p<0.05, ⇤ p<0.1, + p<0.15
Notes: All results include the following controls: gender, minority group, age, age squared, preventive medical service, calorie intake,
unhealthy diet, livestock raising, tap water access, flush toilet, excreta near house
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Table 3.7: Estimated Effect of 2006 Policy on Health Based on Water Quality and 
Income (Factor Analysis) 
	
Adults Children
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Predcited Sickness Index Predcited Sickness Index Predcited Sickness Index Predcited Sickness Index
Post 2006 X Water Pollution Level 0.0199+ 0.0238⇤ 0.0635 0.0679+
(0.0125) (0.0125) (0.0452) (0.0450)
Water Pollution Level 0.0809⇤⇤⇤ 0.0789⇤⇤⇤ 0.0904 0.0884
(0.0274) (0.0274) (0.0773) (0.0768)
Post 2006 0.172 0.282⇤⇤ -0.0305 0.186
(0.264) (0.125) (0.861) (0.340)
Post 2006 X Per Capita Household Income -0.0271⇤ -0.0314⇤⇤ -0.0231 -0.0253
(0.0139) (0.0138) (0.0374) (0.0373)
Per Capita Household Total Income 0.0297⇤⇤⇤ 0.0311⇤⇤⇤ -0.0128 -0.0118
(0.0111) (0.0111) (0.0288) (0.0289)
Individual Fixed E↵ects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed E↵ects Yes Yes
Year Trend Yes Yes
Observations 30984 30984 4909 4909
Adults Children
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Household Predcited Sickness Index Household Predcited Sickness Index Household Predcited Sickness Index Household Predcited Sickness Index
Post 2006 X Water Pollution Level 0.0168 0.0204+ 0.0631+ 0.0707⇤
(0.0138) (0.0138) (0.0413) (0.0414)
Water Pollution Level 0.0721⇤⇤ 0.0687⇤⇤ 0.0901 0.0857
(0.0310) (0.0311) (0.0719) (0.0718)
Post 2006 0.0726 0.224+ 0.282 0.496
(0.140) (0.139) (0.343) (0.347)
Post 2006 X Per Capita Household Income -0.0204 -0.0234+ -0.0579+ -0.0619+
(0.0158) (0.0157) (0.0379) (0.0376)
Per Capita Household Total Income 0.0237⇤ 0.0247⇤⇤ 0.00482 0.00627
(0.0125) (0.0126) (0.0277) (0.0277)
Individual Fixed E↵ects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed E↵ects Yes Yes
Year Trend Yes Yes
Observations 14781 14781 4461 4461
⇤⇤⇤ p<0.01, ⇤⇤ p<0.05, ⇤ p<0.1, + p<0.15
Notes: All results include the following controls: gender, minority group, age, age squared, preventive medical service, calorie intake,
unhealthy diet, livestock raising, tap water access, flush toilet, excreta near house
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Table 3.8: Estimated Effect of 2006 Policy on Health Based on Water Quality and 
Income (Principal Component Analysis) 
	
Adults Children
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Predcited Sickness Index Predcited Sickness Index Predcited Sickness Index Predcited Sickness Index
Post 2006 X Water Pollution Level 0.0207⇤ 0.0247⇤⇤ 0.0725+ 0.0763⇤
(0.0125) (0.0125) (0.0449) (0.0448)
Water Pollution Level 0.0812⇤⇤⇤ 0.0792⇤⇤⇤ 0.0854 0.0836
(0.0274) (0.0274) (0.0773) (0.0769)
Post 2006 0.162 0.276⇤⇤ -0.131 0.147
(0.264) (0.125) (0.862) (0.340)
Post 2006 X Per Capita Household Income -0.0265⇤ -0.0309⇤⇤ -0.0192 -0.0211
(0.0139) (0.0138) (0.0374) (0.0373)
Per Capita Household Total Income 0.0296⇤⇤⇤ 0.0310⇤⇤⇤ -0.0149 -0.0140
(0.0111) (0.0111) (0.0289) (0.0289)
Individual Fixed E↵ects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed E↵ects Yes Yes
Year Trend Yes Yes
Observations 30984 30984 4909 4909
Adults Children
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Household Predcited Sickness Index Household Predcited Sickness Index Household Predcited Sickness Index Household Predcited Sickness Index
Post 2006 X Water Pollution Level 0.0177 0.0213+ 0.0711⇤ 0.0779⇤
(0.0138) (0.0138) (0.0412) (0.0412)
Water Pollution Level 0.0723⇤⇤ 0.0689⇤⇤ 0.0849 0.0810
(0.0310) (0.0311) (0.0723) (0.0722)
Post 2006 0.0653 0.217+ 0.229 0.488
(0.140) (0.139) (0.342) (0.346)
Post 2006 X Per Capita Household Income -0.0200 -0.0229+ -0.0563+ -0.0599+
(0.0157) (0.0157) (0.0378) (0.0376)
Per Capita Household Total Income 0.0235⇤ 0.0245⇤ 0.00379 0.00509
(0.0125) (0.0126) (0.0277) (0.0277)
Individual Fixed E↵ects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed E↵ects Yes Yes
Year Trend Yes Yes
Observations 14781 14781 4461 4461
⇤⇤⇤ p<0.01, ⇤⇤ p<0.05, ⇤ p<0.1, + p<0.15
Notes: All results include the following controls: gender, minority group, age, age squared, preventive medical service, calorie intake,
unhealthy diet, livestock raising, tap water access, flush toilet, excreta near house
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Table 3.9: Estimated Effect of 2006 Policy on Health Based on Water Quality and 
Income 
	 	
All age Age 18 and above Age below 18
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Sick Diarrhea BMI BMI Z-Score Height-For-Age Z-Score
Post 2006 X Water Pollution LevelX Farming Household 0.00134 0.00404 -0.137⇤⇤⇤ -0.0298 -0.0422
(0.00896) (0.00377) (0.0469) (0.0846) (0.0666)
Post 2006 X Per Capita Household Income X Farming Household 0.0280⇤⇤ -0.00147 0.0786+ -0.0802 0.0724
(0.0112) (0.00452) (0.0526) (0.0918) (0.0710)
Post 2006 X Water Pollution Level -0.0000517 0.00198 0.0202 -0.0219 -0.0143
(0.00564) (0.00223) (0.0259) (0.0503) (0.0438)
Post 2006 X Farming Household -0.238⇤⇤ 0.000874 -0.219 0.797 -0.498
(0.0995) (0.0400) (0.477) (0.822) (0.608)
Farming Household X Water Pollution Level -0.0116+ -0.00207 0.0417 -0.0194 -0.0355
(0.00762) (0.00324) (0.0311) (0.0646) (0.0520)
Post 2006 X Per Capita Household Income -0.0153⇤⇤⇤ 0.000240 -0.0651⇤⇤ 0.0662 -0.0441
(0.00571) (0.00237) (0.0282) (0.0553) (0.0445)
Farming Household X Per Capita Household Income -0.00771 -0.00248 -0.00771 0.103+ -0.0387
(0.00917) (0.00385) (0.0408) (0.0690) (0.0561)
Post 2006 0.257⇤⇤ -0.0689⇤ 1.025⇤ 0 0
(0.102) (0.0395) (0.582) (.) (.)
Water Pollution Level 0.0327⇤⇤⇤ 0.00722⇤ -0.193⇤⇤⇤ -0.135+ -0.00247
(0.00998) (0.00402) (0.0523) (0.0926) (0.0708)
Farming Household 0.0982 0.0340 -0.0241 -0.821 0.468
(0.0796) (0.0337) (0.361) (0.607) (0.470)
Per Capita Household Total Income 0.0115⇤⇤ 0.00140 0.0470⇤⇤ -0.0546 0.0226
(0.00451) (0.00191) (0.0214) (0.0407) (0.0301)
Individual Fixed E↵ects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 38525 38489 31011 4919 4995
⇤⇤⇤ p<0.01, ⇤⇤ p<0.05, ⇤ p<0.1, + p<0.15
Notes: All results include the following controls: gender, minority group, age, age squared, preventive medical service, calorie intake,
unhealthy diet, livestock raising, tap water access, flush toilet, excreta near house
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Chapter 4: Optimal Fertilizer Management in Agriculture Internalizing Health 
Cost of Nitrate Pollution  
4.1 Introduction 
Nitrate contamination in drinking water threatens public health in at least three 
medical conditions: methemoglobinemia (blue-baby syndrome), adverse birth outcome, 
and cancer (Hester et al. 1996; Powlson et al. 2008; Haden et al. 2016). A major source 
of nitrate in groundwater comes from excessive use of chemical fertilizers and livestock 
manure for crop production (Haden et al. 2016). Nitrogen is a key element of nutrients to 
crops and nitrogen fertilizers are widely used to help improve the crop production. 
However, not all the nitrogen can be absorbed by crops. Some of the nitrogen flows into 
the groundwater and converts to nitrate through a series of chemical reactions which is 
called nitrification. When the nitrate accumulates in the groundwater, it takes decades for 
nitrate reduce back to nitrogen gas. With the increasing demand for chemical fertilizers in 
agriculture, nitrate accumulates faster in the agricultural area. Given groundwater is the 
major drinking water source in some rural area, the negative health impact of nitrate 
pollution has become a big concern. Up to date, it is still very costly to remove nitrate 
from groundwater. One of the optimal ways to avoid high nitrate contamination in 
groundwater is to control fertilizer application rate during the crop production process.  
The main objective of our research is to develop a dynamic optimization model of 
chemical fertilizer management by incorporating the health cost of nitrate pollution in 
groundwater. Much of the optimization studies include a safe water quality level in the 
constraint (Roseta-Palma, 2002; Wang and Baerenklau, 2014; Yadav,1997). The hole in 
this literature is that the assumed water quality threshold which they maintain might not 
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be healthy enough. A study from van Grinsven et al. (2010) indicates a negative health 
impact from nitrate pollution below the local threshold. A few studies consider the 
removal cost as the damage cost to water pollution (Eiwerth and van Kooten, 2010). It’s 
not realistic to remove all the pollutants in the water, and the removal cost is not a good 
indicator of the health damage.  
Different from existing dynamic optimization studies on the water pollution, we 
use the economic cost (including both direct and indirect cost) of the disease incidence to 
form the health cost function. Extended from previous literature, we establish a dynamic 
optimization model that maximizes the net benefit of fertilizer usage minus the health 
cost of nitrate concentration in groundwater. By applying parameter values and functional 
forms to the theoretical model, we simulate the optimization model in three scenarios 
with different initial nitrate concentration levels: 3 mg/L, 10mg/L, and 30 mg/L. 
The simulation results indicate that optimal fertilizer application rates are 
increasing over time for all three scenarios, with the lowest initial fertilizer application 
rate and highest increasing speed in the case of 30 mg/L nitrate concentration level. In 
addition, the nitrate concentration level is decreasing over time for the cases of 10 mg/L 
and 30 mg/L initial nitrate concentration level, but increasing at a small rate for the case 
of 3 mg/L initial nitrate concentration level. With high decay rate, however, nitrate 
concentration is decreasing even when the initial stock level is low. The trend of health 
cost is similar to the trend of nitrate concentration level since the health cost is assumed 
to be a function of the nitrate concentration level. The paper finds that at the end of the 
50-year period, the optimal fertilizer usage rate in all the scenarios are approaching to the 
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same value; and the nitrate concentration level and health cost in all the scenarios tend to 
be constant and steady.  
Based on the sensitivity analyses, the nitrate decay rate, population, and disease 
incidence rate all affect the optimal fertilizer application paths, while only decay rate 
affects the nitrate concentration levels. This study also indicates that policymakers should 
manage fertilizer application rate based on the initial nitrate concentration levels. 
Fertilizer application should be strictly controlled at the initial period in the heavily 
polluted areas. Furthermore, technologies to increase the nitrate decay rate is also helpful 
to control the nitrate pollution. 
4.2 Background 
Nitrogen (N) is a key element for nutrient. Crop productivity is largely affected by 
the nitrogen availability in the soil. Farmers used to apply organic fertilizers, such as 
livestock manure to help improve the productivity of crops. However, with technology 
advancement, farmers start to apply the chemical fertilizers to help increase their income. 
The process that nitrogen gas (N2) convert to ammonium (NH4+) is called fixation. 
Because the chemical fertilizer is not expensive and easier to use, it largely increases the 
fixation speed. Furthermore, farmers tend to use excessive nitrogen, creating nitrate 
(NO3-) in the soil through a process called nitrification. Although nitrogen itself is not a 
pollutant, nitrate, is a water pollutant affecting public health. The impact has been known 
to include methemoglobinemia (blue-baby syndrome), adverse birth outcome and cancer 
(Hester et al. 1996; Powlson et al. 2008; Haden et al. 2016). The nitrate flows to 
groundwater mainly by leaching in the agriculture.  
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The bigger problem of nitrate is that it is relatively steady and can only convert to 
N2 though a slow chemical reaction called denitrification (Haden et al. 2016). It usually 
takes decades for nitrate to decay due to the high oxygen and low carbon in groundwater 
(Green et al.,2008). As more fertilizer usage break the balance of the natural nitrogen 
cycle, some nitrogen escapes from the surface cycle and store in the “dead zone”-
groundwater. Since the decay speed of nitrate is too slow in groundwater, nitrate tends to 
accumulate in groundwater and threaten public health. It is also costly to clean up nitrate 
from groundwater and not practical in large scale treatment. Thus, the most cost-effective 
way to control nitrate pollution in groundwater is through nitrogen management. My 
research is focused on this kind of management in the agricultural context – the fertilizer 
management. 
The United States Environmental Protection Agency (US EPA) sets the maximum 
contaminant levels (MCL) for Nitrate-N pollution as 10 mg/L for public drinking water 
supplies under the Safe Drinking Water Act (US EPA). Nitrate contamination of 
groundwater is becoming a public health threaten in US in recent years, especially in the 
areas with high agricultural activities. A study by Boyle et al. (2012) shows that 30%-
45% of domestic wells in Fresno and Tulare Counties in California has exceeded the EPA 
MCL, and they estimate that the groundwater nitrate levels are increasing at rate of 
0.061mg/L to 0.120mg/L per year.  
Nitrate threatens public health when groundwater is the main source of drinking 
water.  Nitrate is thought to be related to three types of medical conditions: 
methemoglobinemia (blue-baby syndrome), adverse birth outcome and cancer (Hester et 
al. 1996; Powlson et al. 2008; Haden et al. 2016). Methemoglobinemia happens when a 
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lack of oxygen to the tissues in the body of infants which can be triggered if nitrate is 
taken by infants. There are mixed results from studies on the relationship between nitrate 
amount and methemoglobinemia. Thus, the health cost of this disease incidence is still 
inconclusive (Haden et al. 2016). Nitrate exposure is also thought to affect birth 
outcomes in several studies (Bukowski et al. 2001; Holtby et al., 2014). However, the 
magnitude and threshold of this impact is still uncertain (Haden et al. 2016). Nitrate 
might also relate to the several cancers: breast and genital cancers, brain cancers, stomach 
cancers, colon cancer, etc. Although uncertainty still exist in these studies, van Grinsven 
et al. (2010) is the only study that estimate the health damage of nitrate in groundwater 
based on the colon cancer incidence.  
Some optimal control studies try to balance the relationship between agricultural 
activities and water pollution. Wang and Baerenklau (2014) conduct a dynamic analysis 
of groundwater nitrate pollution from Concentrated Animal Feeding Operations. The 
objective of their model is to maximize the net income, which equals to the profits from 
herd and crop production, less waste management, and the policy cost. They focus on the 
management of leaching and animal waste as well as the implication of the policy. 
Roseta-Palma (2002) considers both water quantity and water quality in his dynamic 
modelling of optimal groundwater extraction. However, the hole in these literature is lack 
of incorporating the health cost of nitrate pollution into the social planner’s objective 
function.  
A few studies take into account the externality cost of water pollution. Yadav 
(1997) is the first to explore the dynamic relationship between agricultural production 
and groundwater pollution. Yadav (1997) also estimates the crop functions through case 
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studies. Instead of using health cost, Yadav (1997) considers the cost to maintain the 
standard nitrate level. Eiwerth and van Kooten (2010) apply a dynamic optimization 
model to examine the optimal path of energy crop land use by considering the damage 
cost of water pollution. The water pollution in their model is connecting to the land use 
instead of agricultural management. And the benefit of the crop comes from the energy 
use. The major drawback in this research is that they consider the removal cost of 
phosphorous rather than health cost.  
4.3 Theoretical Model 
4.3.1 General Model Set-up 
Consider a pure agricultural community with homogeneous farms that plant the 
same type of crop. To simplify, I assume the whole community is built on a single 
aquifer, with an area of A hectares. There is no surface water in the community, so the 
only water source is groundwater with a total volume of  𝐺(	in the aquifer. The only 
income source in this agricultural community is the revenue from harvesting crops, and I 
assume the only inputs affecting the harvest of the crop are nitrogen chemical fertilizers 
application rate 𝐹(	 and irrigation rate 𝐼(. So, other factors, like temperature, soil quality, 
irrigation are not considered in my model.  
The stock pollutant I focus in this paper is the nitrate concentration in 
groundwater, which needs to satisfy  
𝐶( = 𝑁(𝐺(  
where 𝐶(  represents the nitrate concentration and  𝑁(  is the total nitrate amount in the 
community’s groundwater stock at time 𝑡.  
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 The equation of motion of changes in groundwater stock is simplified as 
 𝐺( = −𝐼( −𝑊( + 𝑅( (1) 𝑊( is the residential usage of groundwater and 𝑅( refers to the net natural groundwater 
recharge rate.  
Extended from Yadav (1997) and Hellegers et al. (2001), the nitrate stock 
equation in our model is 
 𝑁( = 𝜂𝐴𝐿(𝐹(, 𝐼() − 𝛿𝑁( + 𝑅(𝐶(y − 𝐼( +𝑊( 𝐶( (2) 
where 𝐿 ∙  is a function of nitrate leached per hectare determined by fertilizer application 
rate 𝐹( and irrigation rate 𝑊(. The function of  𝐿 varies across different types of crops and 
soil conditions. A is the area of farmland (ha). 𝜂 is a parameter describing the amount of 
nitrate leaching in the surface level that flows into the groundwater system at each time 
period; 𝛿  is the parameter representing the degradation rate of nitrate in groundwater. 𝜂	𝑎𝑛𝑑	𝛿 are all positive and less than 1. 𝐶(y  is the nitrate concentration in the recharge 
flows.  
I consider four determinants in this function. The first term represents the inflow of 
nitrate to groundwater caused by nitrate leaching that is not absorbed by crops. It should 
be noticed here that not all the nitrate in the soil flows to the groundwater directly, 𝜂𝐿	of 
nitrate degrades at the surface area through chemical reactions. 𝜂 is affected by factors that 
include the soil properties, weather conditions and surface characteristics. The second term 
indicates nitrate stock in the groundwater degrades at a speed 𝛿 through nitrification- a 
chemical process that transfers nitrate to nitrogen gas. 𝛿 is similar to the decomposition 
rate in the pollutant literature. In groundwater, 𝛿	is usually small and relatively steady. The 
third term is equal to the nitrate increase brought by the recharge inflows. Similarly, the 
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fourth term means the nitrate reduction due to the groundwater extraction. Inspired by 
Hellegers et al. (2001), we include the third and fourth term to capture the dynamic nitrate 
concentration changes caused by groundwater changes. Thus, our motion equation of 
changes in nitrate concentration is  
𝐶( = 𝑁(𝐺( = 𝑁( ∙ 𝐺( − 𝐺( ∙ 𝑁(𝐺(7 = 𝑁( − 𝐺( ∙ 𝐶(𝐺(  
Substitute (1), (2) and simplify, we get 
 𝐶( = 𝜂𝐴𝐿(𝐹(, 𝐼() + 𝑅((𝐶(y − 𝐶()𝐺( − 𝛿𝐶( (3) 
Suppose the net benefit to the community from planting crops is extended from 
Eiwerth and van Kooten (2010), given by the following relation: 
 𝐸( = 𝐵 𝐹(, 𝐼( − 𝐷(𝐶() (4) 
where 𝐸(  stands for the net benefit at time 𝑡  ; 𝐵	(∙)  is the net revenue function from 
cultivating crops. 𝐹( is the amount of fertilizers applied per hectare at time 𝑡; 𝐼( refers to 
the irrigation rate at time t. Since this paper is only interested in the nitrogen in fertilizer, 
we define	𝐹 to be the amount of nitrogen in the fertilizer used for crop planting. Irrigation 
is also a key input that determines the crop yields and we also assume the water used for 
irrigation is purely from the community’s groundwater stock. 𝐷	(∙)  is health damage 
function caused by Nitrate concentration in the groundwater with 𝐷{ > 0 . Although 
Eiswerth and Kooten (2010) assume 𝐷{{ > 0, it might not be true when the pollutant stock 
is extremely large so that people cannot get sicker if they are nearly mortal. It might be true 
when the pollutant is small and close to the threshold. Few studies have been conducted on 
the health impact of nitrate, so I leave	𝐷{{  as unspecified in the general model part. The 
crop net revenue function is defined as 
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 𝐵 𝐹(, 𝐼( = 𝐴[𝑌 𝐹(, 𝐼(	 ⋅ 𝑃 − 𝐹( ∙ 𝑃	 − 𝐼( ∙ 𝑃] (5) 
where 𝑌 ∙  is the crop yield function determined by the applied amount of fertilizer 𝐹( and 
irrigation rate 𝐼(	per hectare ; 𝑃 , 𝑃 are the exogenous prices of crop and fertilizer; 𝑃	is 
the per cubic meter cost of pumping groundwater for irrigation; 𝐴 is the area cultivated for 
the crop. The first term of right hand side of the equation is the revenue from crops. The 
second term and third term represent the cost of inputs. The yield function is assumed to 
be concave in 𝐹( and 𝐼(	 , which indicates 𝑌 > 0, 			𝑌 < 0, 𝑌 > 0, 𝑌 < 0	, 𝑌 > 0. This 
assumption of diminishing return to production is very common in the economics literature, 
and it also realistic because the marginal product from fertilizer is smaller and eventfully 
approaches to zero when the application amount increases to a certain limit.  
Next, consider a social planner of this community tries to maximize the net benefit 
in equation (4).  
                             					𝑚𝑎𝑥, 𝑒([𝐵(𝐹(, 𝐼() − 𝐷(𝐶()+ ]𝑑𝑡 
Combine equations (1) - (5), the optimization problem is 
𝑚𝑎𝑥, 𝑒( 𝐴[𝑌 𝐹(, 𝐼(	 ⋅ 𝑃 − 𝐹( ∙ 𝑃	 − 𝐼( ∙ 𝑃] − 𝐷(𝐶()+ 𝑑𝑡 
𝑠. 𝑡							𝐶( = 𝜂𝐴𝐿(𝐹(, 𝐼() + 𝑅((𝐶(y − 𝐶()𝐺( − 𝛿𝐶( 𝐺( = −𝐴𝐼( −𝑊( + 𝑅( 𝐶 0 = 𝐶+ 𝐶 𝑇 	𝑓𝑟𝑒𝑒 
where r is the social discount rate. I consider this problem as a finite time problem, for 
example, the policy maker only target at a certain period that he will be in charge.  
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4.3.2 A simple model with constant groundwater stock 
First, Let’s consider a case that the community values their only water source and 
would like to keep the groundwater level constant overtime, which means 𝐺(=0 and 𝐺( =𝐺 . To further simplify, we also assume the 𝐼(,  𝑊(  and 𝑅(  are well controlled by the 
community and set to be fixed at 𝐼,	𝑊and 𝑅. 
 The maximizing problem becomes 
𝑚𝑎𝑥 𝑒( 𝐴[𝑌 𝐹(, 𝐼	 ⋅ 𝑃 − 𝐹( ∙ 𝑃	 − 𝐼 ∙ 𝑃] − 𝐷(𝐶()+ 𝑑𝑡 
𝑠. 𝑡							𝐶( = 𝜂𝐴𝐿(𝐹(, 𝐼	) + 𝑅(𝐶(y − 𝐶()𝐺 − 𝛿𝐶( 𝐶 0 = 𝐶+ 𝐶 𝑇 	𝑓𝑟𝑒𝑒 
Assuming an interior solution to the optimization problem, the current value 
Hamiltonian to this optimization problem is  
𝐻 = 𝐴[𝑌 𝐹(, 𝐼	 ⋅ 𝑃 − 𝐹( ∙ 𝑃	 − 𝐼 ∙ 𝑃] − 𝐷(𝐶() + 𝜇[𝜂𝐴𝐿(𝐹(, 𝐼	) + 𝑅(𝐶(y − 𝐶()𝐺 − 𝛿𝐶(] 
where 𝜇 is the current value costate variable associated with the current-value Hamiltonian 
which also represents the shadow value of the nitrate concentration stock. The necessary 
conditions for a solution are 
 𝜕𝐻𝜕𝐹 = 𝐴 𝑌𝑃 − 𝑃 + 	𝜇 𝜂𝐴𝐿𝐺 = 0 (6) 
 𝜕𝐻𝜕𝐶 = −𝐷{ − 𝜇(𝑅𝐺 + 𝛿) = 𝑟	𝜇 − 𝜇 (7) 
 𝜕𝐻𝜕𝜇 = 𝜂𝐴𝐿(𝐹(, 𝐼	) + 𝑅(𝐶(y − 𝐶()𝐺 − 𝛿𝐶( = 	𝐶 (8) 
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 𝐶 0 = 𝐶+ (9) 
 𝜇 𝑇 = 0 (10) 
Equation (6) indicates that the control variable F should be chosen so that the 
marginal benefit of fertilizer equals the marginal damage of fertilizer through its impact on 
the future nitrate stock. Equation (7) provides the optimal solution that equals the marginal 
contribution of nitrate stock with the marginal contribution of the current stock through its 
impact on the future stock and function of the change rate in shadow values of nitrate stock. 
The derivate of shadow value of the pollution with respect to time increases with the 
discount rate, marginal damage of stock pollutant and the degradation rate. Equation (8) 
indicates the derivate of current value Hamiltonian with respect to time is equal to the state 
function. The change rate of nitrate concentration stock is affected by fertilizer usage, 
current stock, degradation rate and conversion rate. Equation (9) is the initial condition of 
nitrate stock. Equation (10) is the transversally condition that indicates the shadow value 
of the stock at the end of period is equal to 0. Rearrange Equation (6) 
 𝜇 = (𝑃 − 𝑌𝑃) ∙ 𝐺𝜂𝐴𝐿 (11) 
Take first order derivative with respect to t 
 𝜇 = −𝑃𝑌𝐹 𝐺𝜂𝐴𝐿＋(𝑃 − 𝑌𝑃) 𝐺𝜂𝐴 𝐿 − 𝐿𝐿7 𝐹 (12) 
Substitute (11) and (12) into (7) and rearrange 
𝐹 𝐺𝜂𝐴𝐿 −𝑃𝑌 + (𝑃 − 𝑌𝑃) 𝐿 − 𝐿𝐿 = 𝑟 + 𝛿 + 𝑅𝐺 (𝑃 − 𝑌𝑃) 𝐺𝜂𝐴𝐿 + 𝐷{  
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𝐹 = [ 𝑟 + 𝛿 + 𝑅𝐺 (𝑃 − 𝑌𝑃) ∙ 𝐺𝜂𝐴𝐿 + 𝐷{] ∙ 𝜂𝐴𝐿𝐺
∙ 	 𝐿−𝑃𝑌𝐿 + (𝑃 − 𝑌𝑃)(𝐿 − 𝐿) 
Simplify  
 𝐹 = 𝑟 + 𝛿 + 𝑅𝐺 (𝑃 − 𝑌𝑃)
+ 𝐷{ 𝜂𝐴𝐿𝐺 𝐿−𝑃𝑌𝐿 + (𝑃 − 𝑌𝑃)(𝐿 − 𝐿) 
(13) 
Setting 𝐹 = 0 gives the steady-state condition for F: 
 𝑟 + 𝛿 + 𝑅𝐺 𝑌𝑃 − 𝑃 𝐺𝐿 = 𝐷{𝜂𝐴	 (14) 
Total differentiate  
𝑟 + 𝛿 + 𝑅𝐺 𝐺 𝑌𝑃𝐿 − 𝑌𝑃 − 𝑃 𝐿𝐿7 𝑑𝐹 = 𝜂𝐴𝐷{{𝑑𝐶 
Thus  
 𝑑𝐶𝑑𝐹 = 𝑟 + 𝛿 + 𝑅𝐺 𝐺𝑀𝜂𝐴𝐷{{𝐿7  (15) 
where 𝑀 = 𝑌𝑃𝐿 − 𝑌𝑃 − 𝑃 𝐿. 
Since 
 [ > 0 , the sign of  { depends on the sign of  𝐷{{  and 𝑀 which are 
unspecified in the general model. According to the nitrate leaching function and crop 
response function from Peña-Haro et al.(2009), M should be negative. If  𝐷{{ > 0,  {  is 
negative, which means 𝐹 = 0 isocline is downward sloping; If 𝐷{{ < 0,  {  is positive, 
which means 𝐹 = 0 isocline is  upward sloping. 
	87	
	
Similarly, setting 𝑁 = 0 in Equation (8) yields 
 𝜂𝐿(𝐹() = 𝛿𝐺 + 𝑅 𝐶( − 𝑅𝐶(y (16) 
 𝑑𝐶𝑑𝐹 = 𝜂𝐴𝐿𝛿𝐺 + 𝑅 (17) 
Since 𝐿,	𝜂,	𝛿 are all positive, the slope of 𝑁 = 0 isocline is positive. 
4.3.3 Joint management of fertilizer and irrigation 
Irrigation rate affect crop yields, nitrate leaching and groundwater stock. When the 
irrigation rate increases, crop yields is higher which brings more benefits; nitrate leached 
increases which leads to higher nitrate stock and concentration in groundwater; and 
groundwater stock decreases which might leads to even higher nitrate concentration. 
 If we consider the joint management of fertilizer and irrigation, by adding 𝐼(	as the 
second control variable and relax the consumption of constant groundwater stock. The 
Hamiltonian function becomes  
𝐻 = 𝐴 𝑌 𝐹(, 𝐼( ⋅ 𝑃 − 𝐹( ∙ 𝑃	 − 𝐼( ∙ 𝑃 − 𝐷 𝐶( + 𝜇 𝜂𝐴𝐿(𝐹(, 𝐼() + 𝑅(𝐶(y − 𝐶()𝐺( − 𝛿𝐶(+ 𝜆[−𝐴𝐼( −𝑊 + 𝑅] 
First order conditions are 
 = 𝐴 𝑌𝑃 − 𝑃 + 	𝜇 [ = 0   = 𝐴 𝑌𝑃 − 𝑃 + 	𝜇 [ − 𝐴𝜆 = 0  { = −𝐷{ − 𝜇(y + 𝛿) = 𝑟	𝜇 − 𝜇  
 = −𝜇 [(,)y({{) = 𝑟𝜆	 − 𝜆  
 = [(,)y({{) − 𝛿𝐶( = 	𝐶  
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 = −𝐴𝐼( −𝑊 + 𝑅 =	𝐺  
4.4 Numerical Example  
My numerical example examines the optimal fertilizer application rate over time 
under different scenarios. The crop type I focus in this paper is corn used for grain purpose. 
Some types of corn are planted for energy purpose. Their economic values are different 
from corn for grain, so I only consider the case of corn for grain in this paper. Several 
studies have been conduct to examine the corn response function to nitrogen fertilizer. 
Yadav (1997) discusses different types of functional forms of corn-response function 
(quadratic, Von Liebig and Mit-Banle) and estimates the crop response based on quadratic 
form.  Quadratic form is the most popular functional form used in crop yields function, 
based on Peña-Haro et al.(2009), the corn yield function in our model is  
𝑌 𝐹, 𝐼 = −13 + 0.038𝐼 − 0.000024𝐼7 + 0.0067𝐹 − 0.000072𝐹7 + 0.0000517𝐼𝐹 
where 𝐹 is the fertilizer application rate (kg) per hectare (ha) of crop land;	𝐼 is the water 
applied for irrigation (𝑚8/ℎ𝑎) ; 	𝑌 𝐹, 𝐼  is the corn yields per hectare (kg/ha). According 
to this function, 𝑌 = 0.0067 − 0.000144𝐹 + 0.0000517𝐼, 𝑌 = −0.000144, satisfies 
our assumption that 𝑌 > 0	𝑎𝑛𝑑	𝑌 < 0	when the fertilizer application rate is below (465.28 − 0.36𝐼)kg/ha. Thus, it seems reasonable to be used as the yield function in my 
application. 
Nitrate leaching function calculates the amount of nitrates leached associated with 
fertilizer application rate and irrigation rate. Nitrate leaching also depends on crop and soil 
characteristics. In this paper, we apply the nitrate leaching function of corn from Peña-
Haro et al.(2009). 𝐿 𝐹, 𝐼 = 0.0044𝐼 − 0.0000669𝐼7 + 0.396𝐹 
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where 𝐿 𝐹, 𝐼  is the nitrogen amount in nitrates leached (kg/ha). 
Three major health damage from drinking water with high level of nitrate has been 
found in previous studies: methemoglobinemia (blue-baby syndrome), adverse birth 
outcome and cancer (Haden et al. 2016). However, the magnitude of the first two health 
impact is uncertain. Our health damage function is based on the research by van Grinsven 
et al. (2010) that estimate colon cancer incidence caused by nitrate pollution in 
groundwater. van Grinsven et al. (2010) estimate that 3% increase of colon cancer 
incidence is associated with 5.63mg/L nitrate contamination of groundwater. I use a 
quadratic function form to represent health damage from water pollution as 𝐷 𝑁 = 𝐸(𝐵 ∙ 𝑁 + 𝐶 ∙ 𝑁7) 
where	(𝐵 ∙ 𝑁 + 𝐶 ∙ 𝑁7) is the increase in the disease incidence and E is 
𝐸 = 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡 ∙ 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒	𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒 ∙ ( 𝑃𝑂𝑃100000) 
where 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡 is the economic cost per colon cancer incidence per year; 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒	𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒 is 
the current colon cancer incidence per 100000 per year; 𝑃𝑂𝑃 is the total population in the 
community. Since the actual health damage remains unproven, I will also conduct 
sensitivity analysis on higher health risk which represent as a higher c in the damage 
function. The health cost is also sensitive to population density, i.e community with higher 
population density occurs higher health cost. Thus, a sensitivity analysis that applies higher 
population is also conducted. 
Table 4.1 presents the parameter values. 𝜂	is determined from a study conducted by 
Roseta-Palma (2002); 𝛾 is derived from the book by Haden et al. (2016);  𝑃	is estimated 
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based on corn commodity price8;	𝑃 is from NMSU ACES website9. 𝛿 is the decay speed 
of nitrate in groundwater and it depends on geographic and groundwater conditions.  
Nitrate decays very slow in groundwater and can takes decades to complete denitrification 
process. I assume the 𝛿 to be 0.1 in the baseline case and conduct sensitivity analysis for 
different values of 𝛿.  
According to Brown et al. (2001), the incidence of colon cancer is 43.9 per 100,000 
population and the cost of illness of cancer is $99,960 per incidence per year in 1996 US 
dollar value, which is equivalent to $155,198 per incidence per year in 2017 US dollar 
value. The population is assumed to be 30,000 in this community in the baseline case. 
Therefore, E is equal to $2,043,957 in the baseline case. Based on van Grinsven et al. 
(2010), I use the trendline tool in the Excel and come up with the following functional form  𝐷 𝑁 = 2,043,957	(0.0007 ∙ 𝑁 + 0.0008 ∙ 𝑁7) 
Furthermore, I assume the height of aquifer GH is 50 meters; total area of farming 
land is 10,000 hectares; the social discount rate r is 0.05. 
4.5  Baseline Results 
Three scenarios of initial nitrate concentrations are considered in my simulation: 
3mg/L, 10mg/L and 30mg/L. The initial nitrate concentration is essential to the optimal 
decision of fertilizer management. When the initial nitrate concentrate is low, for 
example, 3mg/L, the health cost is also relatively low. Then it might be the case that the 
nitrate concentration level becomes higher over time. 10 mg/L is the safe drinking water 
standard by US EPA, which is my second scenario. 10 mg/L is a moderate risk and not 
ideal for sensitive groups. I expect the nitrate level decreases to a more accepted level in 
																																								 																				8	http://www.indexmundi.com/commodities/?commodity=corn	
9 http://aces.nmsu.edu/pubs/_a/A133/welcome.html 
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this case. In the third scenario, the initial nitrate concentration level is assumed to be 30 
mg/L, which is considered to be very high. In this scenario, the nitrate concentration is 
expected to decrease over time. With the optimal fertilizer application path over time, the 
nitrate concentration level is expected to drop dramatically. 
In all the simulations, I use a time period of 50 years. The social planner tries to 
find the optimal fertilizer application rate that maximize the sum of present value of net 
benefits from each year. Figures 4.1-4.7 show the simulation results of all the three 
scenarios. Figure 4.1 is the optimal path of the fertilizer application rate to all the farming 
land for the baseline case. It’s interesting to see that optimal fertilizer application rate 
under all the three scenarios are increasing over time. The higher the initial nitrate 
concentration level, the quicker the optimal fertilizer rate is increasing over time. Note 
that at the end of the 50-year period, the optimal fertilizer application rates are almost the 
same for all the three cases. The intuition behind this figure is straightforward. Since the 
initial net benefits in the regions with high level of nitrate concentration are much lower 
than those with low level of nitrate concentration, they need lower fertilizer concentration 
rates to keep the nitrate concentration decreasing to the optimal level. And after they 
reach the optimal nitrate concentration levels, their fertilizer usage rate will be almost the 
same as other regions.  
Figures 4.4-4.6 present the trend of the stock of nitrate concentration in 
groundwater. The nitrate concentration level is decreasing rapidly in regions with initial 
high nitrate concentration and relatively slower in regions with initial moderate nitrate 
concentration. Regions with low initial nitrate concentration level face an increasing 
trend in their nitrate stock, though the total increasing level is only about 0.44 mg/L. 
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Regions with high pollution tend to decrease because the health cost is too high at the 
beginning period. The decreasing speed becomes slower over time because the 
opportunity cost to continue decreasing stock pollutant is higher than before. Eventually, 
the stock nitrate concentrate will be constant at a certain level, which is called the steady 
state. 
Figure 4.7 shows the health cost over time. Since the health cost is a function of 
nitrate concentration, the trend of health cost is also similar to the trend of the nitrate 
stock. It is noticeable that the health cost in the scenario of initial high nitrate level is 
proportionally higher than the health cost in the scenario of moderate nitrate level. It 
indicates that the marginal health damage is larger as the nitrate concentration level 
increase. Again, health cost under all the three scenarios are approaching to a constant 
level. As we can see from the figure, the health cost is huge, as much as 1.52 million US 
dollars per year at the beginning period and 0.68 million US dollars at the end of the 
period in the scenario of initial 30mg/L nitrate concentration. However, this cost only 
consider the incidence of colon cancer caused by nitrate, which ignores cost from other 
diseases due to the lack of relevant studies in estimating the magnitude of the other health 
impact. It is very likely that the real health cost is much higher than this and would result 
in a lower steady state nitrate concentration level. 
4.6 Sensitivity Analysis 
Because of the uncertainty of the parameter values and functional forms, I also 
conduct several sensitivity analyses by changing some parameters values. 
First I change the value of δ to 0.2 and 0.05 to represent the case with higher and 
lower nitrate decay rate. The fertilizer application rate paths are shown in Figure 4.2. In 
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the case of high decay rate, the fertilizer application rate is a little higher in the beginning 
period, and increase at a little lower speed than the baseline case. It makes sense because 
high decay rate means the outflow of stock pollutant is larger, more nitrate inflow could 
be allowed through applying more fertilizers.  In the case of low decay rate, fertilizer 
application rate is lower to compromise he lower outflow of nitrate stock. Figures 4.4-4.6 
present the nitrate concentration rate in high and low decay rate cases, as well as the 
baseline case. In the scenario of low initial nitrate stock, nitrate concentration is 
decreasing when the decay rate is high, while increasing when the decay rate is low and 
baseline. In the other two scenarios, although nitrate concentration is decreasing with 
different decay rates, the decreasing speed is slower with lower decay rate. Eventually, 
the higher the decay rate, the lower the nitrate stock at the end of the period. 
The second sensitivity analysis is conducted by replacing with a higher 
population. This analysis is necessary because the different population density could also 
affect the total disease incidence and health cost. Figure 4.3 shows the fertilizer 
application rate by doubling the population of the baseline case. The fertilizer application 
rates are again lower than the baseline case at the beginning period to compensate the 
higher health cost cause by higher population. Eventually, at the end of the period, the 
fertilizer application rate is similar to the baseline case. However, the nitrate 
concentration trend is almost the same as the baseline case, which lead to a similar slope 
but higher level of health cost over time (shown in Figures 4.4-4.7). 
To test how the result would be different for a different functional form of health 
damage function, I undertake the third sensitivity analysis by simply replacing C with a 
larger value which represent a higher disease incidence. The results again shows a lower 
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fertilizer application rate at the beginning period (Figure 4.3) , but almost same trend in 
the nitrate concentration stock (Figures 4.4-4.6). The health cost is also highest compared 
to baseline and high population cases. 
From the results of last two sensitivity analyses, it seems that the change in the 
health cost function wouldn’t affect the nitrate stock over time. However, the optimal 
fertilizer application rates are quite different over time to incorporate the change in the 
total health cost.  
4.7 Conclusion 
The main objective of this paper is to find the optimal fertilizer application rate in 
agriculture by incorporating the health cost from nitrate pollution in groundwater. I 
establish a dynamic optimization model that maximize the net benefit of fertilizer usage 
minus the health cost of nitrate concentration in groundwater.  
By applying parameter values and functional forms to the theoretical model, I 
simulate the optimization model in three scenarios with different initial nitrate 
concentration levels: 3 mg/L, 10 mg/L and 30 mg/L. The optimal fertilizer application 
rates are increasing over time for both three cases, with the lowest initial fertilizer 
application rate and highest increasing speed in the case of highest nitrate concentration 
level. In addition, the nitrate concentration level is decreasing over time for cases of 
10mg/L and 30 mg/L initial nitrate concentration level, but increasing at a small rate for 
the cases of 3 mg/L initial nitrate concentration level. However, with high decay rate, 
nitrate concentration is decreasing even when the initial stock level is low. The trend of 
health cost is similar to the trend of nitrate concentration level since the health cost is 
assumed to be a function of the nitrate concentration level. I also find that at the end of 
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the 50-year period, the optimal fertilizer usage rate in all the three scenarios are 
approaching to the same value; and the nitrate concentration level and health cost in all 
the three scenarios tend to be constant and steady. 
In the sensitivity analyses, I find the nitrate decay rate, population and incidence 
rate all affect the optimal fertilizer application paths, while only decay rate actually affect 
the nitrate concentration levels. 
Health cost could be as much high as 1.52million US dollars in my simulations. 
Without taking into account this health cost, the optimal fertilizer managing will not be 
social optimal. Policy makers should note the health cost could be potentially larger by 
adding up all the health cost of nitrate-related morbidity and mortality. The policies 
regarding this externality include: mandatory nitrate concertation standard and incentives 
to encourage less chemical fertilizer usage. US EPA (Environmental Protection Agency) 
currently set the nitrate standard as 10 mg/L. Based on my simulation result, I think this 
standard might not be lower than social optimal in the areas with high initial nitrate 
levels. When implementing environmental policies, it is also essential to consider the 
initial pollution condition in different regions. 
4.8 Limitations and Future Work 
This research has a lot of limitations. First, it does not consider the change in 
groundwater level in aquifer. Since irrigation from groundwater causes high variations in 
groundwater level and thus variations in nitrate concentration. It’s important to consider 
the change in groundwater by controlling irrigation which might also impact the crop 
production.  Second, we only consider the nitrate in groundwater other than surface 
water. In reality, surface water is a part of water system and should not be overlooked. 
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Third, people can help reduce nitrate in groundwater by leaching abatement or remove 
the nitrate from groundwater at a high expense. This research does not take into account 
the other treatment. Fourth, excessive fertilizer usage also reduces the fertility of soil that 
impact the crop productivity which should endogenously affect the optimal fertilizer 
usage.  Finally, this research assumes the policymakers only make plans for 50 years 
which may not be the case in the real life. If the planning time is long enough, it is 
possible that the fertilizer application rate and nitrate concentration reach the steady state. 
A potential future work of this study is to look at the steady states mathematically and 
discuss the case of longer policy years.  
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Figure 4.1: Optimal Fertilizer Application Rate: Baseline Case 
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Figure 4.2: Optimal Fertilizer Application Rate: Different Decay Rate 
(a) High Decay Rate 
 
(b) Low Decay Rate  
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Figure 4.3: Optimal Fertilizer Application Rate: Higher Population and Caner Incidence 
(a) Higher Population 
	
	
(b) Higher Cancer Incidence 
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Figure 4.4: Nitrate Concentration Level in Scenario 1 (3mg/L initial value) 
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Figure 4.5: Nitrate Concentration Level in Scenario 2 (10mg/L initial value) 
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Figure 4.6: Nitrate Concentration Level in Scenario 3 (30mg/L initial value) 
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Figure 4.7: Health Cost 
(a) Scenario 1 (3mg/L initial value) 
	
(b) Scenario 2 (10mg/L initial value) 
	
(c) Scenario 3 (30mg/L initial value) 
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Table 4.1: Description and value of parameters 
Parameter Description 
Baseline 
Value 
Units 
𝜂10	 Scaling parameter describing rate of leached 
nitrate flows into groundwater 
0.9 1 
𝛿11 Degradation rate of nitrate in groundwater 0.1 1 𝑃¥12 Cost of groundwater extraction 0.1 USD/m^3 𝑃13 Price of corn per kilogram 0.16 USD/kg 𝑃14 Price of fertilizer per kilogram 0.75 USD/kg 
Cost15 Economic cost per incidence per year 155,198  USD 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒16 Colon cancer incidence per 100,000 per year 43.9 per 100,000 
POP Population in community 30,000 person 
A Area of farming land 3,600 hectare17 
G Volume of groundwater in aquifer 5,000,000 cubic meter 
R Recharge flow to groundwater 3,900,000 cubic meter 
CR Nitrate concentration in recharge flow 20 mg/L 
I Irrigation rate  700 m^3/ ha 
r Social discount rate 0.05 1 
  
																																								 																				10	Haden et al. (2016)	11	Roseta-Palma (2002)	12 USGS website	13	based on commodity price of corn:	http://www.indexmundi.com/commodities/?commodity=corn	14	NMSU ACES website:	http://aces.nmsu.edu/pubs/_a/A133/welcome.html 15	Brown et al. (2001)	16	van Grinsven et al.(2010)	17	1 hectare=2.47 acre	
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Chapter 5: Conclusion  
Modern agricultural development solves the basic feeding problems for poor 
people in the developing areas, but also brings a series of environmental issues. Water 
pollution, especially nitrate contamination, is the most severe externalities that harm 
public health, caused by excessive use of chemical fertilizers in agriculture. However, the 
impact of agricultural water pollution is not well studied in previous literature. The 
contributions of Chapter 2 are threefold. First, it extends the research on the health 
impacts of agricultural water pollution. The health impact of water pollution is not a new 
topic, however much of the existing research does not specifically examine the impact of 
water pollution due to agricultural activities. Second, most of the current evidence on the 
relationship between water quality and health from household-level studies use water 
access or water source as a proxy for exposure to water pollution but lacks actual water 
quality measurements. I am the first that I am aware of to link administrative water 
quality data with household data in China. Third, I am also the first that I am aware of to 
explore the effect of agricultural water pollution on early childhood health using 
household survey data. The main limitations of this research include: it is possible that 
the 2006 agricultural support policies also impacted the local non-agricultural economy 
in ways that also affect water quality; the water quality data might not perfectly capture 
the households' drinking water pollution level.  
Knowing the negative effect doesn't mean we should object to the agricultural 
policies. In developing countries where some poor people still live without enough food, 
such policies is very important to help them improve nutrition and health status. But the 
effectiveness of such polices could easily be overlooked due to unexpected disturbance. 
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The third chapter's major contribution is examining the effectiveness of China's 
agricultural supporting policies in the view of both income effect and pollution effect. 
The limitations of this research include: the income change might not capture the change 
in the real health investment and avoidance behavior; some unknown factors associated 
with the polices might also affect the health outcomes. 
Agricultural management should incorporate the negative health impact caused by 
agricultural water pollution. Chapter 4 contributes to existing research by quantifying the 
health cost of nitrate pollution and adding it into the classic profit optimization problem. 
It also discusses the current nitrate standard in the simulations which is not common in 
previous studies. However, this research has limitations, like not considering the 
complications of the groundwater change in aquifer and only focusing on the fertilizer 
management.  
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Appendices A:  
Table A.1: Estimated Effect of Agricultural Water Pollution on Health Post 2006 - Using 
Province-Level Water Pollution Index 
  
All age Age 18 and above Age below 18
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Sick Diarrhea BMI BMI Z-Score Height-For-Age Z-Score
Post 2006 X Water Pollution Index 0.0215⇤⇤⇤ 0.00921⇤⇤⇤ -0.0321 -0.0328 -0.0610
(0.00625) (0.00250) (0.0274) (0.0588) (0.0466)
Water Pollution Index 0.0907⇤⇤⇤ 0.0159⇤⇤⇤ -0.0172 -0.201 -0.162
(0.0140) (0.00525) (0.0836) (0.158) (0.113)
Post 2006 0.0871 -0.0792⇤⇤ 0.554 -0.323 0.302
(0.0906) (0.0353) (0.525) (0.568) (0.411)
Individual Fixed E↵ects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 38525 38489 31011 4919 4995
Note: Significant levels are indicated by ⇤⇤⇤ p<0.01, ⇤⇤ p<0.05, ⇤ p<0.1. All results include the following controls: gender, minority
group, age, age squared, preventive medical service, calorie intake, unhealthy diet, livestock raising, tap water access, flush toilet,
excreta near house, log income
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Table A.2: Estimated Effect of Early Childhood Agricultural Water Pollution Exposure 
on Health - Using Province-Level Water Pollution Index 
  
Age 6 and below
(1) (2)
BMI Z-Score Height-For-Age Z-Score
Born after 2006 X Water Pollution Index -0.188 0.130
(0.136) (0.109)
Born after 2006 0.537 -0.193
(0.383) (0.338)
Water Pollution Index 0.0152 -0.180
(0.256) (0.217)
Year Fixed E↵ects Yes Yes
Community Fixed E↵ects Yes Yes
Observations 1393 1434
Note: Significant levels are indicated by *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. All results include the following controls: gender, minority
group, age, age squared, preventive medical service, calorie intake, unhealthy diet, livestock raising, tap water access, flush toilet,
excreta near house, log income
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Table A.3: Estimated Effect of Agricultural Water Pollution on Health Based on Access 
to Treated Water - Using Province-Level Water Pollution Index 
 
All age Age 18 and above Age below 18
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Sick Diarrhea BMI BMI Z-Score Height-For-Age Z-Score
Untreated water X Post 2006 X Water Pollution Index -0.0159 -0.000962 -0.0949⇤⇤ 0.138 -0.0797
(0.00993) (0.00403) (0.0483) (0.0887) (0.0699)
Post 2006 X Water Pollution Index 0.00711 0.00577⇤ 0.0158 -0.0836 0.0195
(0.00789) (0.00316) (0.0386) (0.0745) (0.0658)
Untreated water X Water Pollution Index 0.00168 0.000912 0.0717⇤ -0.121⇤ 0.00557
(0.00808) (0.00369) (0.0388) (0.0713) (0.0520)
Untreated Water X Post 2006 0.0457 0.00523 0.448⇤⇤⇤ -0.419 0.197
(0.0319) (0.0129) (0.156) (0.271) (0.210)
Untreated Water -0.0122 -0.00551 -0.240⇤ 0.340 -0.0515
(0.0264) (0.0114) (0.128) (0.234) (0.176)
Individual Fixed E↵ects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 38525 38489 31011 4919 4995
Note: Significant levels are indicated by ⇤⇤⇤ p<0.01, ⇤⇤ p<0.05, ⇤ p<0.1. All results include the following controls: gender, minority
group, age, age squared, preventive medical service, calorie intake, unhealthy diet, livestock raising, tap water access, flush toilet,
excreta near house, log income
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Table A.4: Estimated Effect of Early Childhood Agricultural Water Pollution Exposure 
on Health Based on Access to Treated Water - Using Province-Level Water Pollution 
Index 
 
Age 6 and below
(1) (2)
BMI Z-Score Height-For-Age Z-Score
Untreated Water X Born after 2006 X Water Pollution Index -0.0648 -0.486⇤⇤
(0.256) (0.207)
Untreated Water X Water Pollution Index 0.0566 0.207⇤
(0.132) (0.121)
Born after 2006 X Water Pollution Index -0.149 0.435⇤⇤
(0.222) (0.177)
Untreated Water X Born after 2006 0.189 1.201⇤⇤
(0.689) (0.602)
Untreated Water -0.202 -0.517
(0.403) (0.368)
Born after 2006 0.432 -0.912⇤
(0.580) (0.488)
Water Pollution Index -0.0332 -0.339
(0.273) (0.239)
Year Fixed E↵ects Yes Yes
Community Fixed E↵ects Yes Yes
Observations 1393 1434
Note: Significant levels are indicated by *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. All results include the following controls: gender, minority
group, age, age squared, preventive medical service, calorie intake, unhealthy diet, livestock raising, tap water access, flush toilet,
excreta near house, log income
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Table A.5: Estimated Effect of Agricultural Water Pollution on Health Post 2006 - Using 
Province-Level Drinkable Water Percentage 
	
All age Age 18 and above Age below 18
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Sick Diarrhea BMI BMI Z-Score Height-For-Age Z-Score
Post 2006 X Drinkable Water Percentage 0.00364 -0.0175⇤⇤ 0.193⇤ -0.267 0.281
(0.0203) (0.00717) (0.114) (0.231) (0.178)
Drinkable Water Percentage 0.0610⇤⇤ 0.0242⇤⇤ 0.729⇤⇤⇤ 0.296 -0.0319
(0.0284) (0.0117) (0.169) (0.274) (0.207)
Post 2006 -0.186⇤⇤⇤ -0.0409⇤⇤⇤ -0.172⇤⇤ -0.0745 0.00716
(0.0146) (0.00591) (0.0733) (0.152) (0.115)
Individual Fixed E↵ects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 46572 46442 36482 6555 6644
Note: Significant levels are indicated by ⇤⇤⇤ p<0.01, ⇤⇤ p<0.05, ⇤ p<0.1. All results include the following controls: gender, minority
group, age, age squared, preventive medical service, calorie intake, unhealthy diet, livestock raising, tap water access, flush toilet,
excreta near house, log income
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Table A.6: Estimated Effect of Early Childhood Agricultural Water Pollution Exposure 
on Health - Using Province-Level Drinkable Water Percentage 
	
Age 6 and below
(1) (2)
BMI Z-Score Height-For-Age Z-Score
Born after 2006 X Drinkable Water Percentage 0.768⇤ -0.467
(0.466) (0.410)
Drinkable Water Percentage -0.158 0.459
(0.623) (0.509)
Born after 2006 -0.414 0.398
(0.317) (0.263)
Year Fixed E↵ects Yes Yes
Community Fixed E↵ects Yes Yes
Observations 1694 1741
Note: Significant levels are indicated by *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. All results include the following controls: gender, minority
group, age, age squared, preventive medical service, calorie intake, unhealthy diet, livestock raising, tap water access, flush toilet,
excreta near house, log income
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Table A.7: Estimated Effect of Agricultural Water Pollution on Health Based on Access 
to Treated Water - Using Province-level Drinkable Water Percentage 
	
All age Age 18 and above Age below 18
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Sick Diarrhea BMI BMI Z-Score Height-For-Age Z-Score
Untreated water X Post 2006 X Drinkable Water Percentage -0.0336 -0.00744 0.246 0.0258 0.291
(0.0391) (0.0134) (0.230) (0.382) (0.287)
Post 2006 X Drinkable Water Percentage 0.0174 -0.0130 0.199 -0.233 0.178
(0.0265) (0.00930) (0.144) (0.297) (0.230)
Untreated water X Drinkable Water Percentage 0.0301 -0.00124 0.125 0.0117 0.0594
(0.0246) (0.0100) (0.144) (0.228) (0.175)
Untreated Water X Post 2006 0.0144 0.00589 0.00473 0.0307 -0.183
(0.0213) (0.00743) (0.122) (0.217) (0.174)
Untreated Water -0.0242⇤ -0.00182 -0.0882 -0.0745 -0.0299
(0.0144) (0.00603) (0.0854) (0.135) (0.110)
Individual Fixed E↵ects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 46572 46442 36482 6555 6644
Note: Significant levels are indicated by ⇤⇤⇤ p<0.01, ⇤⇤ p<0.05, ⇤ p<0.1. All results include the following controls: gender, minority
group, age, age squared, preventive medical service, calorie intake, unhealthy diet, livestock raising, tap water access, flush toilet,
excreta near house, log income
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Table A.8: Estimated Effect of Early Childhood Agricultural Water Pollution Exposure 
on Health Based on Access to Treated Water - Using Province-Level Drinkable Water 
Percentage 
	
Age 6 and below
(1) (2)
BMI Z-Score Height-For-Age Z-Score
Untreated Water X Born after 2006 X Drinkable Water Percentage 0.693 1.841⇤⇤
(0.941) (0.827)
Untreated Water X Drinkable Water Percentage 0.341 -0.723
(0.514) (0.473)
Born after 2006 X Drinkable Water Percentage 0.500 -1.390⇤⇤
(0.643) (0.572)
Untreated Water X Born after 2006 -0.409 -1.246⇤⇤
(0.615) (0.510)
Untreated Water -0.284 0.456
(0.319) (0.289)
Born after 2006 -0.247 1.057⇤⇤⇤
(0.445) (0.377)
Drinkable Water Percentage -0.341 1.037
(0.730) (0.644)
Year Fixed E↵ects Yes Yes
Community Fixed E↵ects Yes Yes
Observations 1694 1741
Note: Significant levels are indicated by *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. All results include the following controls: gender, minority
group, age, age squared, preventive medical service, calorie intake, unhealthy diet, livestock raising, tap water access, flush toilet,
excreta near house, log income
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Table A.9: Estimated Effect of Agricultural Water Pollution on Health Post 2000 - Using 
Province-level Drinkable Water Percentage 
  
Age 6 and below
(1) (2)
BMI Z-Score Height-For-Age Z-Score
Untreated Water X Born after 2006 X Drinkable Water Percentage 0.693 1.841⇤⇤
(0.941) (0.827)
Untreated Water X Drinkable Water Percentage 0.341 -0.723
(0.514) (0.473)
Born after 2006 X Drinkable Water Percentage 0.500 -1.390⇤⇤
(0.643) (0.572)
Untreated Water X Born after 2006 -0.409 -1.246⇤⇤
(0.615) (0.510)
Untreated Water -0.284 0.456
(0.319) (0.289)
Born after 2006 -0.247 1.057⇤⇤⇤
(0.445) (0.377)
Drinkable Water Percentage -0.341 1.037
(0.730) (0.644)
Year Fixed E↵ects Yes Yes
Community Fixed E↵ects Yes Yes
Observations 1694 1741
Note: Significant levels are indicated by *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. All results include the following controls: gender, minority
group, age, age squared, preventive medical service, calorie intake, unhealthy diet, livestock raising, tap water access, flush toilet,
excreta near house, log income
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Table A.10: Estimated Effect of Agricultural Water Pollution on Health Post 2000 Based 
on Access to Treated Water - Using Province-level Drinkable Water Percentage 
 
	  
All age Age 18 and above Age below 18
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Sick Diarrhea BMI BMI Z-Score Height-For-Age Z-Score
Untreated water X Post 2000 X Drinkable Water Percentage -0.0336 0.0141 -0.545⇤⇤ -0.325 -0.0139
(0.0390) (0.0163) (0.235) (0.360) (0.288)
Post 2000 X Drinkable Water Percentage 0.0227 -0.00748 0.591⇤⇤⇤ 0.0691 0.140
(0.0272) (0.0113) (0.166) (0.268) (0.203)
Untreated water X Drinkable Water Percentage 0.0410 -0.00879 0.518⇤⇤ 0.289 0.0691
(0.0332) (0.0139) (0.215) (0.308) (0.257)
Untreated Water X Post 2000 0.00241 -0.0146 0.339⇤⇤ 0.304 0.147
(0.0224) (0.0101) (0.142) (0.210) (0.171)
Untreated Water -0.0188 0.00962 -0.293⇤⇤ -0.326⇤ -0.170
(0.0206) (0.00910) (0.140) (0.191) (0.162)
Individual Fixed E↵ects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 46572 46442 36482 6555 6644
Note: Significant levels are indicated by ⇤⇤⇤ p<0.01, ⇤⇤ p<0.05, ⇤ p<0.1. All results include the following controls: gender, minority
group, age, age squared, preventive medical service, calorie intake, unhealthy diet, livestock raising, tap water access, flush toilet,
excreta near house, log income
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